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STATE WITHDRAWAL NOTIFICATIONS FROM THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
SOUTH AFRICA, BURUNDI AND THE GAMBIA
ABSTRACT. In 2016 three African states namely South Africa, Burundi and The
Gambia submitted written notifications of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations pursuant to Article 127 of the Rome Statute. Although the African Union
welcomed and fully supported the three withdrawal notifications and considered
them as pioneer implementers’ of its Withdrawal Strategy’, The Gambia and South
Africa withdrew their notifications of withdrawal. Some other states – Kenya, Na-
mibia and Uganda – have made threats to submit withdrawal notifications. This
article examines four issues arising out of the said withdrawal notifications. First,
why did the three states submit withdrawal notifications from the Rome Statute?
Second, what is the impact of the three states’ withdrawal notifications? Third, is the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (or the yet-to-be-established African
Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights) a suitable African regional al-
ternative’ to the ICC? Finally, what steps might be taken to avoid, or at least
minimise, further withdrawals in the future and to avoid impunity of perpetrators of
international crimes in states that have withdrawn from the Rome Statute?
I INTRODUCTION
In recent years the growing discontent with the perceived unequal
application of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Rome Statute),1 the founding treaty of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), particularly among some African leaders, culminated in
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Criminal Law Forum  The Author(s). This article is an open access publication 2017
DOI 10.1007/s10609-017-9321-z
3 state withdrawal notifications out of 124 state parties.2 In October
and November 2016, three African Union (AU) member state parties
to the Rome Statute – The Republic of South Africa (South Africa),3
the Republic of Burundi (Burundi)4 and The Republic of The
Gambia (The Gambia)5 – submitted their written notifications of
withdrawal from the Rome Statute to the United Nations (UN)
Secretary General.6 This was done in accordance with Article 127(1)
of the Rome Statute, which provides that a state party to the Rome
Statute may withdraw from the Statute by written notification ad-
dressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations’.7 The noti-
fications of withdrawals were welcomed and supported by the
African Union (AU) as part of the AU’s Withdrawal Strategy’ from
the Rome Statute.8 However, both The Gambia and South Africa
withdrew their notifications of withdrawal before they became
effective. At present, this signals their renewed commitment to the
Rome Statute. Unless Burundi also withdraws its notification of
withdrawal at any time before it becomes effective, its withdrawal
shall take effect one year after the date of receipt by the UN Secre-
2 Assembly of States Parties, States Parties to the Rome Statute, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%
20the%20rome%20statute.aspx. For recent literature on the ICC and Africa see
generally KM Clarke et al. (eds), Africa and the ICC: Perceptions of Justice (Cam
bridge University Press, 2016); EA Ankumah (ed), The International Criminal Court
and Africa: One Decade On (Intersentia, 2016); and J Nyawo, Selective Enforcement
and International Criminal Law: The International Criminal Court and Africa (Inter
sentia, 2017).
3 South Africa deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on 27
November 2000.
4 Burundi deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on 21
September 2004.
5 The Gambia deposited its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute on 28
June 2002.
6 The official notifications of withdrawal were received by the UN secretary General
on 19 October 2016 for South Africa, 27 October 2016 for Burundi, and 10 November
2016 for The Gambia. See the following Withdrawal Depository Notifications:
C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (South Africa); C.N.805.2016.TREATIES-
XVIII.10 (Burundi) and C.N.862.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (The Gambia).
7 For a commentary on Art 127 see Roger S Clark, Article 127: Withdrawal’ in O
Triffterer and K Ambos (eds), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Commentary, 3rd edn (CH Beck, Hart, Nomos, 2016) 2322–2324.
8 Decision on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/1006(XXX),
Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.1(XXVIII)Rev.2 (30–31 January 2017) para 8; African
Union (AU), Withdrawal Strategy Document (2017, on file with author).
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tary-General.9 This will make Burundi the first state party to the
Rome Statute in the world to withdraw from the Rome Statute,
15 years since the Statute entered into force.
South Africa, one of the first signatories to the Rome Statute,10
ratified the Rome Statute on 27 November 2000 after first obtaining
parliamentary approval.11 In order to ensure the effective imple-
mentation of the Rome Statute in South Africa, in accordance with
the South African Constitution, a domestic statute was enacted
through the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court 2002.12 This made South Africa the first African state
to domesticate the Rome Statute. On 19 October 2016, the govern-
ment of South Africa Minister of International Relations and
Cooperation, acting for the executive and without seeking or
receiving prior approval of the South African parliament or any
public consultation,13 unilaterally submitted to the UN Secretary
General a notification of South Africa’s withdrawal from the Rome
Statute.14 This was followed by a Parliamentary Bill to repeal the
Implementation of the Rome Statute in South Africa.15
9 Rome Statute, Art 127(1). Unless Burundi’s withdrawal notification is with-
drawn, it shall take effect on 27 October 2017.
10 South Africa signed the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998 (the date it was first
opened for signature).
11 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 231(2), provides
that an international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved
by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces’;
Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 48/10) [2011]
ZACC 6, para 89 Ngcobo CJ.
12 Act 27 of 2002, adopted by Parliament in 2002, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.
gov.za/files/a27-02.pdf; Glenister (n 11), para 95; National Commissioner of the South
African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and An
other (CCT 02/14), [2014] ZACC 30; Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1996, Section 231(4): Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic
when it is enacted into law by national legislation…’.
13 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, Section 231(2) (n 10). By
implication even withdrawal notification from an international agreement like the
Rome Statute must follow the procedure in Section 231(2) – it must be submitted
after it has been approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the
National Council of Provinces’.
14 See UN, South Africa: Withdrawal, C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10.
15 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act
Repeal Bill, 2016, http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/
20161111/616356_1.pdf.
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Although South Africa’s withdrawal notification was revoked on
7 March 2017 in order to adhere to a High Court judgment,16 it is
still useful to understand events leading to South Africa’s notifica-
tion of withdrawal, which came after three significant recent
developments. First, in June 2015, the High Court of South Africa,
Gauteng Division, Pretoria, ordered the South African government
to prohibit the President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (Al Bashir), who is subject to two ICC arrest
warrants,17 from leaving South Africa, which the South African
government ignored.18 The Supreme Court of Appeal of South
Africa found that South Africa’s failure to take steps to arrest and
detain, for surrender to the ICC, Al Bashir, after his arrival in South
Africa on 13 June 2015 to attend the 25th AU Assembly, was
inconsistent with South Africa’s obligations under the Rome Sta-
tute.19 The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II had earlier made it clear that
ICC State parties including South Africa are under an obligation to
arrest and surrender Al Bashir to the ICC.20 Second, the AU (which
16 See Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation
and Others, Case No 83145/2016 (High Court of South Africa, 22 February 2017),
http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.pdf, declaring the notice of with
drawal, without prior parliamentary approval, unconstitutional and invalid’.
17 See Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir’, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 2009 (warrant for seven counts of war crimes
and crimes against humanity); Pre-Trial Chamber I, Second Warrant of Arrest for
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’, ICC- 02/05-01/09-95, 12 July (warrant for three
counts of genocide).
18 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice And Constitutional
Development and Others, Case No 27740/2015, 2015 (9) BCLR 1108 (GP) (24 June
2015), http://saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2015/402.html.
19 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African
Litigation Centre (867/15) [2016] ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016). The Supreme Court of
Appeal’s decision in this case is final since on 18 November 2016, the Constitutional
Court of South Africa issued a direction noting South Africa’s withdrawal of its
appeal to the Constitutional Court, The Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development and Others v The Southern African Litigation Centre and Others, CCT
75/16.
20 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision following the
Prosecutor’s request for an order further clarifying that the Republic of South Africa
is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Omar Al Bashir, ICC-02/
05-01/09-242, 13 June 2015; The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,
Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding
Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09-195, 9 April
2014, paras 28–31.
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has more than a third of member states as non-parties to the Rome
Statute),21 had made several decisions calling upon African States
not to cooperate with the ICC22 and urged its member states to
consider collective withdrawal from the ICC’.23 Third, South
Africa’s withdrawal notification came after the withdrawal process
initiated by Burundi24 and later supported by The Gambia.25
This article examines key issues in connection with the three
withdrawal state notifications. Section II examines reasons for
withdrawal notifications. It considers why did the three states submit
notifications of withdrawal from the Rome? Section III analyses the
likely consequences of the 3 withdrawal notifications from the Rome
Statute. Section IV considers whether the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (or the future African Court of Justice and
Human and Peoples’ Rights) is a suitable African regional alternative
or complementary to the ICC. Section V makes concluding obser-
vations. It comments on whether the three withdrawing states should
consider withdrawing the withdrawal notifications and outlines
measures that might be taken to avoid, or at least minimise, further
withdrawals in the future and to avoid impunity of perpetrators of
international crimes in states that have withdrawn from the Rome
Statute.
21 34 out of 54 AU member states (62 per cent) were parties to the Rome Statute in
December 2016, making African states the largest block of state parties to the Rome
Statute.
22 See e.g. the following AU decisions on the ICC: Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), 3
July 2009, para 10; Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV), 27 July 2010, para 5; Assembly/AU/
Dec.397(XVIII), 30 January 2012, paras 6 and 8.
23 See Decision on the International Criminal Court - Doc. EX.CL/952(XXVIII),
AU Assembly/AU/Dec 590 (XXVI) 30–31 January 2016, para 10(iv).
24 See Government of Burundi, Press Release of the Meeting of Council of
Ministers of Thursday, October 6, 2016, http://www.burundi.gov.bi/spip.php?arti
cle1534. On 12 October 2016, the Burundian Parliament voted in favour of Burundi’s
withdrawal from the Rome Statute and on 18 October 2016, President Pierre Nku
runziza of Burundi signed off the bill for Burundi’s withdrawal from the ICC, after
the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda opened a preliminary examination in April
2016 into possible crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Burundi since
April 2015. See also UN Depository Notification, Burundi: Withdrawal, C.N.805.
2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10, 27 October 2016.
25 See UN Depository Notification, Gambia: Withdrawal, C.N.862.2016.TREA-
TIES-XVIII.10, 11 November 2016.
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II REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL NOTIFICATIONS FROM
THE ROME STATUTE
Article 127 of the Rome Statute which applies to withdrawals from
the Statute does not require states to provide any reason for with-
drawing. It follows, therefore, that a state party to the Rome Statute
may submit a withdrawal notice from the Statute at any time, in
accordance with Article 127, without giving any reason, good or
bad’.26 While withdrawal notifications of Burundi and The Gambia
did not state any specific reason(s) for withdrawing, it is possible to
infer some reasons from the prevailing circumstances in both states
before withdrawal notifications were submitted. South Africa decided
to give reasons for its withdrawal.27 An analysis of the reasons ad-
vanced by South Africa is helpful in understanding why it took this
step and what needs to be done to avoid further possible withdrawal
notifications in the future by any other state sharing the same views
as South Africa. In what follows, an analysis is made of the reasons
that principally motivated the three withdrawal notifications.
2.1 Avoiding Accountability before the ICC for Possible International
Crimes
Both withdrawal notifications of Burundi and The Gambia were in-
tended to ensure that state officials including sitting heads of state –
President Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi since 2005 and President
Yahya Jammeh of The Gambia from 1994 to 19 January 2017 –
escape possible criminal investigations and prosecutions before the
ICC. Burundi experienced violence before and after legislative and
presidential elections since April 2015 including a failed coup de tat in
May 2015. The government responded by carrying out several
operations leading to gross violations of human rights possibly
amounting to crimes against humanity of killing, other inhumane
acts, imprisonment, torture, rape and other sexual violence, as well as
cases of enforced disappearances and acts of persecution’.28 Thus, on
26 Clark (n 7), 2322.
27 See Declaratory Statement by the Republic of South Africa on the Decision to
Withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (19 October 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf.
28 ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
2016, 14 November 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_
ENG.pdf, paras 36, 39–52.
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25 April 2016, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination
of the situation in Burundi since April 2015. On 20 September 2016,
the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi found that gross
human rights violations have taken place and are taking place,
committed primarily by State agents and those linked to them’.29 The
Commission added that these violations were widespread, systematic
and patterned and impunity [was] pervasive’.30 The Commission ex-
pressed the view that some of the violations could amount to crimes
against humanity and that independent international processes
determine accountability for possible international crimes’.31 Fol-
lowing these findings, the UN Human Rights Council decided, on 30
September 2016, to create for a period of one year a commission of
inquiry into human rights abuses in Burundi since April 2015 that
would identify alleged perpetrators of human rights violations in
Burundi with a view to ensuring full accountability.32
Burundi’s head of state and other state officials did not want the
Prosecutor to proceed with the preliminary examination because they
would be possibly identified among the alleged perpetrators. At the
time more than 430 persons had reportedly been killed, at least 3,400
people arrested and over 230,000 Burundians forced to seek refuge in
neighbouring countries’.33 The preliminary examination focussed on
acts of killing, imprisonment, torture, rape and other forms of sexual
violence, as well as cases of enforced disappearances that have been
allegedly committed since April 2015 in Burundi.34 It should be noted
that a full investigation can still be carried out since withdrawal has
no impact on withdrawing state obligations (to cooperate with the
Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings)
under the Rome Statute prior to the date on which the withdrawal
29 Report of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB)
established pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1, UN Doc A//HRC/
33/37, 20 September 2016, 1.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., paras 123–124.
32 Human Rights Council, Human Rights Situation in Burundi, UN Doc A/HRC/
33/L.31, 27 September 2016. See also African Commission Resolution on the Human
Rights Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ACHPR/Res.357(LIX) 2016, 4
November 2016.
33 ICC, Preliminary Examination: Burundi, https://www.icc-cpi.int/burundi.
34 Ibid.
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becomes effective.35 However, it would be very difficult for the
Prosecutor to obtain Burundi’s cooperation with the investigations.
For The Gambia President Jammeh was concerned that the situ-
ation in The Gambia could potentially be subjected to a preliminary
investigation by the ICC. Jammeh took power in a coup in 1994 but
lost an election on 1 December 2016.36 This happened shortly after
submission of The Gambia’s notice of withdrawal from the Rome
Statute. Jammeh’s government frequently committed serious human
rights violations including arbitrary detention, enforced disappear-
ance, and torture against those who expressed opposition to the
government’ especially in the aftermath of the 30 December 2014
attempted coup.37 These could amount to crimes against humanity.
The Gambia under President Jammeh consistently demonstrated its
lack of commitment to accountability before judicial and quasi-ju-
dicial bodies. For example, it refused to implement three legally
binding decisions by the Court of Justice of the Economic Commu-
nity of West African States (ECOWAS Court) regarding the tor-
ture,38 murder39 and enforced disappearance of journalists,40 and it
has on several occasions failed to cooperate with the resolutions of
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is
35 Rome Statute, Art 127(2); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980)
1155 UNTS 331, Art 70(1)(b).
36 The Gambian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared that Barrow
obtained 222,708 votes (43.3 percent) while Jammeh obtained 208,487 (39.6 percent).
See IEC, The Total of Final Results, 5 December 2016, at http://iec.gm/the-total-of-
final-election-results/.
37 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016: Gambia, https://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2016/country-chapters/gambia; European Parliament Resolution of 12
May 2016 on The Gambia (2016/2693(RSP)).
38 See Musa Saidykhan v Republic of The Gambia, Suit NO ECW/CCJ/APP/11/07,
Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/10 (6 December 2010) concerning the award of
damages in the sum of USD 200,000 for arrest, detention and torture of journalist
Musa Saidykhan for 22 days without any lawful excuse and without trial.
39 See Deyda Hydara Jr. and Others v The Gambia, Case No ECW/CCJ/APP/30/
11 (10 June 2014), the ECOWAS Court awarded damages of US $50,000 for the
prejudice suffered as a result of the government’s failure to conduct effective and
impartial investigations into the assassination of Deyda Hydara (former publisher
and editor of the Banjul-based newspaper The Point, and former president of the
Gambian Press Union) leading to culture of impunity in the Gambia.
40 See Chief Ebrimah Manneh v The Republic of The Gambia, Suit No ECW/CCJ/
APP/04/07, Judgment No ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/08 (5 June 2008). The ECOWAS
Court ordered The Gambia to immediately release journalist Manneh and pay
damages in the sum of USD100 000 to Manneh or, in his absence, to his family.
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based in Banjul, The Gambia.41 Its withdrawal notification was a
clear manifestation of its unwillingness to be subjected to a possible
ICC investigation.
Nevertheless, it might still be possible to investigate the situation
in The Gambia since President Jammeh lost an election in December
2016 to Adama Barrow.42 Since Jammeh was forced to carry out a
peaceful and orderly transition process, and to transfer power to
President-elect Adama Barrow’ in January 2017 in accordance with
the Gambian Constitution,43 Barrow indicated that he would
withdraw the notification to withdrawal The Gambia from the Rome
Statute since there is no need for us [The Gambia] to leave the
ICC’.44 Given that the withdrawal notification was an executive
decision made without prior parliamentary approval or any public
consultation, it can be withdrawn by an executive act at any time
before it becomes effective.
Since the new government of The Gambia has expressed com-
mitment to the rule of law and accountability, in February 2017 it
notified the UN Secretary General of its decision to rescind’ the
41 See eg, African Commission, Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the
Republic of The Gambia, Doc ACHPR/Res.134 (XXXXIIII) 2008 adopted at the
Commission’s 44th Ordinary Session, Abuja, Nigeria, 10–24 November 2008; Res-
olution on the Deteriorating Human Rights Situation in The Gambia, adopted at the
Commission’s 7th extraordinary session, Dakar, Senegal, 11 October 2009, http://
www.achpr.org/sessions/7th-eo/resolutions/145/.
42 UN News Centre, Gambia: UN Calls on Outgoing President to Respect
Election Results and to Carry Out a Peaceful Transition’, 10 December 2016, http://
www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55776#.WE2k2j5vjIU.
43 See UN Security Council, Presidential Statement: Gambian Leaders Must
Respect Vote Result, S/PRST/2016/19, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12650.
doc.htm; UN Security Council Resolution 2337, S/RES/2337 (19 January 2017) para
7; Joint Declaration by the Economic Community of West African States, the Afri
can Union and the United Nations on the Political Situation of the Islamic Republic
of The Gambia on 21 January 2017, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ecowas-au-un-
joint-communique.pdf.
44 K Cham, The Gambia’s New President to ‘‘Reverse ICC Withdrawal’’ The East
African, 6 December 2016, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/The-Gambia-new-pre
sident-to-reverse-ICC-withdrawal/2558-3476690-pufyxjz/index.html. See also LMogeni,
GambiaMay Not Join Other African States in ICCWithdrawal’ TheWire, 9 December
2016, http://thewire.in/85747/gambia-icc-africa/; P Saine and L Jahateh, Gambia An
nouncesPlans toStay in InternationalCriminalCourt’,Reuters, 13February 2017, http://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gambia-justice-icc-idUKKBN15S2HD.
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notification of withdrawal with immediate effect’.45 It also confirmed
that The Gambia still considers itself as a state party and will con-
tinue to honour its obligations under the Rome Statute’.46 The
rescission of The Gambia’s notification of withdrawal was historic –
the first time a state has taken such a step. It offered some hope that
the new Gambian government might help pave the way to account-
ability in the future. The rescission of the withdrawal notification
means that it is still possible for the ICC to investigate the situation in
The Gambia.
2.2 Alleged Loss of Credibility by the ICC
The South African government claimed that the ICC as a judicial
body has lost its credibility primarily because of the Court’s rela-
tionship with the UN Security Council as a UN political organ.
South Africa further stated that the ICC has lost credibility due to
the perceived focus of the ICC on African states, notwithstanding
clear evidence of violations by others [commission of international
crimes outside Africa]’.47 This view was restated by The Gambia’s
information minister, Sheriff Baba Bojang, who claimed that The
Gambia’s withdrawal notification was warranted by the fact that the
ICC, despite being called International Criminal Court, is in fact an
International Caucasian Court for the persecution and humiliation of
people of colour, especially Africans’.48 Has the ICC lost its credi-
bility due to its relationship with the UN Security Council to justify
withdrawal by (some African) state parties? Has it been selective on
investigating and prosecuting crimes committed only by Africans in
African states while ignoring similar or worse crimes committed
outside Africa?
2.2.1 The UN Security Council Exclusive Referral of Situations in
Africa to the ICC
The UN Security Council, a political body, acting on behalf of
all UN member states to maintain international peace and security
45 UN, Gambia: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, C.N.62.2017.
TREATIES-XVIII.10 (16 February 2017).
46 Ibid.
47 Declaratory Statement (n 27). Both the US and Russia signed but never ratified
the Rome Statute and later unsigned’ the Statute.
48 J Bavier Gambia Announces Withdrawal from International Criminal Court’
26 October 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-gambia-icc-idUKKCN12P333.
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under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,49 has power to give the ICC
jurisdiction by referring a situation’ to the ICC Prosecutor in which
one or more crimes within the ICC jurisdiction appear to have been
committed.50 The Security Council can trigger proceedings over the
crime of aggression.51 The referral practice of the Council has been
characterised by double standards, lack of consistence and coherence
as well as inaction or lack of effective support after referral. The ICC
as an independent permanent international organisation is entirely
autonomous from, but has an important relationship with, the UN.52
Since the ICC does not participate in the Security Council’s decision-
making, it is not responsible for the Council’s practice.
However, its credibility as a judicial body has certainly been af-
fected by the Council’s practice. The Council has to date referred two
situations to the Prosecutor, exclusively in Africa – Darfur (Sudan)53
and Libya,54 which does not reflect the aspiration to the universal
vocation of the Court. In both situations, the Council required that
Sudan and Libya cooperate fully’ and provide any necessary assis-
tance to the Court’.55 Nevertheless, notwithstanding Article 115 of
the Rome Statute,56 the Council did not provide financial support
for expenses associated with the investigations and prosecutions.57
49 Charter of the United Nations, adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24
October 1945,1 UNTS XVI, Arts 24(1), 39, 41, 48 and 103.
50 Rome Statute (n1), Art 13(b).
51 Ibid., Art 15ter.
52 Ibid., Art 2; Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International
Criminal Court and the United Nations, ICC-ASP/3/Res.1, 4 October 2004.
53 SC Resolution 1593, UN Doc S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005).
54 SC Resolution 1970, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011). Although the
situation in Libya may be seen as concerning mainly Arabs’, Libya is geographically
located in Africa and a member of the African Union. Cases arising out of the
Libyan referral (Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi) deal with Africans.
55 SC Resolution 1593 (n 53) para 2; SC Resolution 1970 (n 54), para 5.
56 Rome Statute (n 1), Art 115 provides that in addition to assessed contributions
made by States Parties, the expenses of the Court shall be provided by the: Funds
provided by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the General Assembly, in
particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security
Council’.
57 SC Resolution 1593 (n 53), para 7; SC Resolution 1970 (n 54), para 8; Twelfth
Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations
Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), 9 November 2016, para 30
noting: the Council has so far failed to provide any meaningful support, financial or
otherwise, to the Office [of the Prosecutor’s] work in Libya’.
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Similarly, it did not provide political support to the ICC or take any
other follow-up actions to ensure that ICC arrest warrants are exe-
cuted by both state parties and non-state parties,58 leaving the
Prosecutor unable to prosecute cases from Sudan59 and to obtain
custody of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi from Libya.60 In fact, five suspects
who are members of the Government of the Republic of Sudan or its
aligned militias remain at large in Sudan, many years after arrest
warrants were issued against them.61 Two warrants for the arrest of
Omar Al-Bashir subsequently issued by Pre-Trial Chamber I (the first
on 4 March 2009 for a number of war crimes and crimes against
humanity62 and the second on 12 July 2010 for the crime of geno-
cide)63 have not been executed. Instead Al Bashir has been able to
travel across several international borders without arrest and sur-
render to the Court, thereby openly undermining Resolution 1593
and the credibility of the Council as well as the Court.
It is well known that Africa is seriously underrepresented on the
UN Security Council, which is steered primarily by great powers who
are permanent members namely China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). According the South
African government: Questions on the credibility of the ICC will
persist so long as three of the five permanent members of the Security
58 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision Regarding the Visit
of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir to the Federal Republic of Ethiopia, ICC-02/05-
01/09, 29 April 2014, para 12 Pre-Trial Chamber II observed that the Security
Council by means of a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
may create an obligation to cooperate with the Court on those UN Member States
which are not parties to the Statute. In such a case, the obligation to cooperate stems
directly from the UN Charter’.
59 See Twenty-Fourth Report of The Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the United Nations Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 13
December 2016, para 36 observing: the Council, as an important pillar of enforce-
ment, has not taken the follow-up steps necessary to ensure that accountability is
realised in practice’. See also Ms. Bensouda in UN Security Council, Reports of the
Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, UN Doc S/PV.7337 (12 December
2014), 2.
60 Twelfth Report of the Prosecutor (n 57), paras 3–9.
61 These suspects are Messrs Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ahmad Muham-
mad Harun, Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Abdel Raheem Muhammad
Hussein, and Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain.
62 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir’,
ICC-02/05-01/09-1.
63 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir’, ICC- 02/05-01/09-95.
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Council [China, Russia and the US] are not State Parties to the
Statute’.64 This is primarily due to their status as non-state parties
and veto power. South Africa’s view suggests that the Security
Council, which is still stuck in the post SecondWorld War hegemony,
has referred African situations to the ICC but ignored similar or
worse situations elsewhere e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, North Korea, Pa-
lestine, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), Ukraine, and the
US with respect to methods used in interrogations and detention
since 9/11.
Situations involving interests of some major political and eco-
nomic states which are permanent members of the UN Security
Council or their allies would never be referred to the ICC. For
example, the situation in Afghanistan did not attract a UN Security
Council referral despite the existence of a reasonable basis to believe’
that crimes were committed in 2003–2004 (continuing in some cases
until 2014) within the Court’s jurisdiction, in particular war crimes of
torture and related ill-treatment, by US military forces deployed to
Afghanistan and in secrete detention facilities operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency’.65 The US would use its veto power against such
a referral investigating crimes committed by US military officials.
In May 2014, Russia and China vetoed a draft UN Security
Council resolution calling for the referral of the situation in Syria
since 15 February 2011 to the ICC Prosecutor– ignoring support for
the referral by 65 other states and all other 13 members of the
Security Council including African states non-permanent members
(Chad and Rwanda).66 This was intended to shield the regime of
President Bashar al-Assad, to which Russia had tied itself over dec-
ades, from ICC investigations and potential prosecutions. Thus while
the Security Council can theoretically refer any situation to the ICC,
in practice only a certain group of states can be referred to the ICC
64 See Declaratory Statement (n 27).
65 ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities
2016, 14 November 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_
ENG.pdf, para 198(c).
66 UN Security Council, Draft Resolution (proposed by France), UN Doc. S/
2014/348 (22 May 2014); UN Security Council, Referral of Syria to International
Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent Security Council from Adopting
Draft Resolution, SC/11407 (22 May 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/
sc11407.doc.htm.
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due to prevailing geo-strategic and international political reasons’
among the permanent UN Security Council members.67
Consequently, this has created a perception that it is only African
sitting heads of state (starting with Al Bashir of Sudan in 2009,
Gaddafi of Libya in 2011, Kenyatta and Ruto of Kenya in 2012) that
commit international crimes and need intervention from the ICC.
This has provided a basis for some African leaders to criticise or
perceive the ICC as a biased instrument of post-colonial hegemony’68
which is intended for developing and weak countries and was a tool
to exercise cultural superiority’69 and thus a vessel for oppressing
Africa again’.70 While there is some merit in criticising the practice of
the Security Council, two observations should be noted.
First, it must be acknowledged that none of the African non-
permanent Security Council members voted against the UN Security
Council referrals in Darfur and Libya: Gabon, Nigeria and South
Africa voted in favour of the Libyan referral,71 while Benin and
Tanzania voted in favour of the Darfur referral.72 Thus African states
67 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), The Prosecutor v Joseph
Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, ICTR-96-15-7, 18
June 1997, para 36 noting: The fact that the Security Council, for previously pre-
vailing geo-strategic and international political reasons, was unable in the past to
take adequate measures to bring to justice the perpetrators of crimes against inter-
national humanitarian law is not an acceptable argument against introducing mea-
sures to punish serious violations of international humanitarian law when this
becomes an option under international law.’
68 F Makana, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni Lashes out at ICC, Wants
Africa to Pull Out’ Standard, 13 December 2014, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/
article/2000144601/ugandan-president-yoweri-museveni-lashes-out-at-icc-wants-afri
ca-to-pull-out.
69 See Security Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to
Prosecutor of International Criminal Court’, 5158th Meeting, SC/8351(31 March
2005), statement by the representative of the Sudan, Elfatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm.
70 D Miriri, Uganda’s Museveni Calls on African nations to quit the ICC’ Reu-
ters,12 December 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-icc-idUSKBN0JQ1
DO20141212. President Museveni described the ICC as a vessel for oppressing Africa
again’.
71 See Security Council, 6491st Meeting, SC/10187/REV.1, 26 February 2011,
http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10187.doc.htm. SC Resolution 1970, was adop
ted unanimously. South African representative, Baso Sangqu, stated that the mea
sures it [SC Resolution 1970] contained could contribute to the long-term objective
of bringing peace and stability to the nation’.
72 See Security Council, 5158th Meeting, SC/8351, 31 March 2005, http://www.un.
org/press/en/2005/sc8351.doc.htm. SC Resolution 1593 (2005) was adopted by a vote
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non-permanent Security Council members including South Africa
have contributed to the practice of Security Council referrals of
African situations to the ICC. The five permanent members would be
unable to refer a situation without the concurrent vote of other non-
permanent members, since a Chapter VII decision requires a major-
ity. Besides, there is no doubt that attacks on the civilian population
in Darfur were war crimes and crimes against humanity.73 It is in this
context that the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan rec-
ommended that those with the greatest responsibility for the atroc-
ities at the highest level should be brought to account’.74 Since Sudan
was unable or unwilling to do so, the Security Council referral of the
situation in Darfur to the ICC is understandable.
Second, any investigation and proceedings that may arise from
any situation referred by the UN Security Council to the ICC is not
determined by the Security Council but governed by the Rome Sta-
tute and the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.75 Decisions are
made by the ICC independent judges through a judicial process and
are not influenced by the Security Council or any other external
body’.76 No evidence exists to show any lack of independence on the
part of ICC judges in the performance of their judicial functions.77
Nonetheless, the current practice of the UN Security Council
referral of African situations while ignoring non-African situations
reflects wider political dynamics at the Security Council. Pressure by
some UN Security Council permanent members undermines efforts at
accountability and impedes the Council from carrying out its referral
Footnote 72 continued
of 11 in favour, none against with 4 abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China, United
States).
73 See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United
Nations Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18
September 2004, 25 November 2005, http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_
darfur.pdf.
74 Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 15
October 2014, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.final.report.pdf, para 1142.
75 See Rome Statute (n 1); ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3
and Corr.1, part II.A, https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/legal-texts/Rule
sProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf.
76 See Statement by the ICC Presidency, ICC Underlines Impartiality, Reiterates
Commitment to Cooperation with the African Union’, ICC-CPI-20130529-PR908,
29 May 2013, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr908&ln=en.
77 Independence of ICC judges is secured through Articles 40, 36, 46, 47 and 49 of
the Rome Statute.
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duties to the ICC Prosecutor in an impartial and effective manner. It
also undermines attempts to adopt resolutions that would have
helped to hold parties accountable. For instance, in the past five
years, Russia has vetoed seven Security Council texts on the Syrian
conflict, while China has cast a negative vote six times on the issue.78
The UN Security Council remains a political body that is subject to
veto wielding and has been inconsistent in referring situations to the
ICC. In this context, the UN Secretary General noted:
[T]here remain serious challenges in pursuing accountability. Some situations
which, by any objective analysis, would have warranted some form of action
by the Security Council, have faced serious obstacles or languished entirely.
This has eroded the Council’s credibility. There is a need to address this
problem, and to bring some consistency to the effort.79
It is essential for the Council to correct its failings by taking concrete
action to refer all deserving situations to the ICC. This requires
developing a transparent and consistent policy setting out objective
criteria for deciding whether or not to refer a situation to the ICC
without any perception of double standards. This will provide an
opportunity for the ICC to extend its global reach.
2.2.2 Security Council Exemption of the US Nationals from the ICC
Jurisdiction
In 2002 the US passed the American Service-members Protection
Act, which prohibits cooperation with the ICC.80 Based on the
insistence of the US, the two Security Council referrals in Darfur and
Libya limited the personal scope of ICC jurisdiction by excluding
certain categories of individuals from non-state parties to the Rome
Statute. In the Darfur referral, for example, the Council decided that:
nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State
outside Sudan which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International
78 See UN News Centre, Russia, China block Security Council Action on Use of
Chemical Weapons in Syria, 28 February 2017, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=56260#.WLcmJvmLTIU.
79 Secretary-General, Honouring Geneva Conventions, Secretary-General Says
Debate No Longer between Peace and Justice but between Peace and What Kind of
Justice’, SG/SM/12494, L/T/4417, HR/5002 (26 September 2009), http://www.un.
org/press/en/2009/sgsm12494.doc.htm.
80 American Service-members’ Protection Act of 2002, https://legcounsel.house.
gov/Comps/aspa02.pdf, sec 2004.
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Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that con-
tributing State for all alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to
operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African
Union, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that
contributing State.81
The above paragraph, which discriminates on the basis of nationality,
was intended to protect US nationals from the ICC jurisdiction and it
was included in the SC resolution as a condition for the US not to
veto the resolution.82 A similar paragraph was included in the SC
resolution referring the Situation in Libya to the ICC Prosecutor,83
and in the draft resolution for the Syria referral.84 Such discrimina-
tory referrals were criticised by states upon adoption.85 The Office of
the Prosecutor (OTP) stated that it has not accepted the effects of the
above discriminatory paragraph and it has stated before the UN
Security Council that it has competence over NATO troops in Libya.
Nonetheless, these referrals were acted upon by the Court without
determining whether the UN Security Council resolutions of situa-
tions in Darfur and Libya were compatible with article 13(b) of the
Rome Statute and the principle of non-discrimination. The Security
Council is not empowered to impose discriminatory exemptions to
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the ICC. It follows that discrimi-
natory exemptions granting immunity to nationals of non-state par-
ties who commit crimes in a situation referred to the Court do not
bind the ICC. Nonetheless by acting upon the UN Security Council
referrals in Sudan and Libya, without any judicial determination of
the effect of the purported exemption clauses on the exercise of the
Court’s jurisdiction, the ICC appears to have, at least in practice,
81 SC Resolution 1593, UN Doc S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005), para 6.
82 UN SC, 5158th Meeting 31 March 2005, United States, UN Doc. S/PV.5158, at
4, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5158: US ambas
sador, Mrs. Patterson, explained that: This resolution provides clear protections for
United States persons. No United States person supporting the operations in the
Sudan will be subject to investigation or prosecution because of this resolution.’
83 SC Resolution 1970, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011), para 6.
84 UN Doc. S/2014/348 (22 May 2014) para 7. Argentina objected to this para-
graph. See The Situation in the Middle East (Syria), UN Doc S/PV.7180, 22 May
2014, record of debates on draft resolution S/201/348, at 11.
85 See eg statements made by representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Philippines,
Records of Debates on Draft Resolution S/2005/218, UN Doc S/PV.518 (31 March
2005), at 6–8, 11; Brazil, Peace and Security in Africa’, UN Doc S/PV.6491 (26
February 2011), Record of Debates on Draft Resolution S/2011/95, at 7.
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implicitly accepted the exemption paragraphs.86 Although the OTP
stated that it has not accepted the effects.
A situation’ under article 13(b) must be referred to the Prosecutor
without any prohibited discriminatory limitation. Under Article 21(3)
of the Rome Statute the application and interpretation of law by the
Court must be consistent with internationally recognized human
rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds
such as gender, … age, race, colour, language, religion or belief,
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth,
birth or other status’.87 This applies to all of its [the Court’s] con-
stituent organs’,88 namely the Presidency, the Chambers, the Office of
the Prosecutor and the Registry.89 Only then can the Prosecutor, in
exercising prosecutorial discretion in selecting situations and cases
under the Rome Statute,90 and the Court, observe the interests of
justice’ including the principle of equality before the law and non-
discrimination, which flows from principles of independence,
impartiality and objectivity.91
Discriminatory Security Council referrals leading to investigations
and prosecutions which exclude individuals (who may have com-
mitted crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction) on the basis of nation-
ality have indeed undermined the credibility of the ICC by subsuming
86 But see contra R Rastan, Jurisdiction’, in C Stahn (ed), The Law and Practice
of the International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press, 2015) 141–178, at 158–
163.
87 Rome Statute, Art 21(3). See also ICTY Judgment, Prosecutor v Delalić et al.
(Čelebići case), IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber, 20 February 2001, paras 605, 611,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf.
88 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on an
Amicus Curiae application and on the ‘‘Requête tendant à obtenir présentations des
témoins DRC-D02-P-0350, DRC-D02-P-0236, DRC-D02-P-0228 aux autorités
néerlandaises aux fins d’asile’’ (articles 68 and 93(7) of the Statute), ICC-01/04-01/07
(9 June 2011), para 77.
89 Rome Statute (n 1), Art 34.
90 Ibid., Art 53(1)(a)–(c). In determining whether there is a reasonable basis’ to
proceed with an investigation into a situation the Prosecutor considers: (i) jurisdic-
tion (temporal, either territorial or personal, and material); (ii) admissibility (com-
plementarity and gravity); and (iii) the interests of justice.
91 See Rome Statute (n 1), Arts 21(3), 42(1 and 7) and 54(1)(a); OTP, Policy Paper
on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/
itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Policy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf, para 16: The Of
fice shall conduct its case selection and prioritisation on the basis of the overarching
principles of independence, impartiality and objectivity’.
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the independence of the ICC into the political and diplomatic vag-
aries of the Security Council’.92 As noted above, this is particularly
the case given that three permanent members of the UN Security
Council namely Russia, China, and the US are not parties to the
Rome Statute and thus are outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. It should
be recalled that when the Rome Statute was adopted in 1998, 120
states voted for the establishment of the ICC with 21 abstentions and
7 against (including the US, Israel and China).93
Both the US94 and Russia95 signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but
later unsigned’ the Statute by making their intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty’, in 2002 and 2016 respectively.96 Rus-
sia’s withdrawal was made shortly after the ICC Prosecutor examined
crimes allegedly committed in the context of Russia’s military actions
in Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine and called the Crimea situation an
international armed conflict and occupation.97 Both the US and
Russia intended to cancel their legal obligation to refrain from
defeating the object and purpose of the Rome Statute i.e. not to
create conditions for or facilitate in any way the commission of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.98
92 UN SC, 5158th Meeting 31 March 2005, Philippines, UN Doc. S/PV.5158, 6,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5158.
93 See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court Rome, Italy 15 June - 17 July 1998, UN
Doc A/CONF.183/SR.9, 9th Plenary Meeting, paras 28, 33 and 40; M Cherif Bas-
siouni and WA Schabas (eds), The Legislative History of the International Criminal
Court, 2nd edn (Brill/Nijhoff, 2016) 101.
94 The US signed the Rome Statute on 31 December 2000 but unsigned’ the
Statute on 6 May 2002 by making clear to the UN Secretary-General its intention
not to become a party’.
95 See Bylaw No 361-rp, On the Russian Federation’s intention not to become a
party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (16 November 2016),
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201611160018. Russia signed
the Rome Statute on 13 September 2000 but unsigned’ it on 30 November 2016 by
informing the UN Secretary-General of Russia’s intention not to become a party to
the Rome Statute’.
96 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XVIII/XVIII-10.en.
pdf.
97 See The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Activities 2016 (14
November 2016) 33–42.
98 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, concluded at Vienna on 23 May
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980 (1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Art 18(a).
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Accordingly, they made it clear that they do not intend to ratify the
Statute in the future or of cooperating with the ICC in a meaningful
way. This was part of the strategy to shield American and Russian
nationals from potential ICC prosecutions in the future.
Thus while powerful permanent UN Security Council members
non-parties to theRomeStatute are highly influential in decidingwhich
situation’ should be referred to the ICC Prosecutor to determine
whether a particular situation should give rise to a criminal investiga-
tion, they have been able to avoid ICC investigations and prosecutions.
De facto, they enjoy immunity from ICC investigations and prosecu-
tions arising from the prospect of aUNSecurity Council referral. They
have used their veto privilege to block referral of situations involving
their allies to the ICC Prosecutor. This has been the case in states that
are not parties to the Rome Statute—and have not accepted the juris-
dictionof theCourt on anadhocbasis—but allies of someUNSecurity
Council permanent members. For example, despite existence of evi-
dence showing that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC appear to
havebeen committed in Syria a referral to the ICCwasblocked.99 In the
words of the Russian Federation delegate:
The United States frequently indicates the ICC option for others, but is
reluctant to accede to the Rome Statute itself. In today’s draft resolution,100 the
United States insisted on an exemption for itself and its citizens. Great Britain is
a party to the ICC, but for some reason is unenthusiastic about the exploration
in the Court of crimes committed by British nationals during the Iraq war. If the
United States and the United Kingdom were to together refer the Iraqi dossier
to the ICC, the world would see that they are truly against impunity.101
The criticism above reveals that Russia is well aware that some states
in particular the US support ICC investigations for crimes committed
99 See reports of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic,http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/
IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx; UN Security Council, Draft Resolution
(proposed by France), UN Doc. S/2014/348 (22 May 2014); UN Security Council,
Referral of Syria to International Criminal Court Fails as Negative Votes Prevent
Security Council from Adopting Draft Resolution, SC/11407 (22 May 2014), http://
www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11407.doc.htm.
100 UN Security Council, Draft Resolution (proposed by France), UN Doc. S/
2014/348 (22 May 2014).
101 UN Security Council, 7180th Meeting, 22 May 2014, S/PV.5158, Mr. Churkin
(Russian Federation), 13 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/
PV.7180. It should be noted that the UK cooperated with the ICC’s Iraq preliminary
inquiry, and has carried out investigations and some court martials.
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by others but not for their nationals or their allies. Therefore Russia
also vetoed a proposed UN Security Council resolution to refer the
situation in Syria to the ICC despite the existence of a reasonable
basis to believe’ that war crimes and crimes against humanity were
committed in Syria102 including indiscriminate and disproportionate
attacks on civilian-inhabited areas, particularly through pounding
aerial bombardments’, unlawful killings, enforced disappearance,
hostage-taking, torture, and sexual violence.103 It should be noted
that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic recommended that the Security Council takes
appropriate action by referring the situation [in Syria] to justice,
possibly to the International Criminal Court or an ad hoc tribunal,
bearing in mind that, in the context of the Syrian Arab Republic, only
the Security Council is competent to refer the situation’.104 However,
no action was taken by the Security Council mainly because of
Russian and Chinese resistance.
The UN General Assembly sidestepped the Security Council by
deciding in Resolution 71/248 to establish the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation
and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes
under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic
since March 2011’ (the IIIM or the Mechanism).105 This is a signif-
icant historic step since it marked the first time the Assembly has
established such a Mechanism. The Mechanism is a fact-finding body
that will rely solely on the voluntary cooperation of states, NGOs and
individuals to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse’ evidence of
crimes for future prosecutions.106 It will not prosecute anyone but
102 See eg Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 21 October
2016:The Deteriorating Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, and
the Recent Situation in Aleppo, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-25/1 (25 October 2016). The
Resolution strongly condemned all attacks against civilians and civilian infrastruc-
ture’.
103 See Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian
Arab Republic, A/HRC/33/55 (11 August 2016).
104 Ibid., para 147(c).
105 See UN General Assembly, International, Impartial and Independent Mech-
anism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Those Responsible for the
Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab
Republic since March 2011, A/71/L.48, 19 December 2016, http://www.un.org/ga/
search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.48, para 4. The vote was 105 to 15, with 52
abstentions. The US voted in favour of the measure.
106 Ibid., para 4.
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prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and independent
criminal proceedings’ in national, regional or international courts or
tribunals that have or may in the future have jurisdiction over these
crimes, in accordance with international law.107
Unlike the Security Council, the General Assembly lacks the
authority to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC or to establish an
ad hoc international criminal tribunal for Syria with the legal
authority to charge individual perpetrators or to require state coop-
eration. Furthermore, it cannot mandate states to cooperate with the
ICC, though it can recommend that the Security Council take such
actions in the future to ensure that perpetrators of international
crimes in Syria are held accountable.108 It is worth noting that the
General Assembly has been involved in prior accountability efforts
since 1946 to promote cooperation by states to investigate and punish
international crimes.109 Thus, establishing such a Mechanism builds
upon earlier practice of the General Assembly with respect to
investigative bodies such as Commissions of Inquiry or Expert Panels
with a view to assisting future accountability efforts. However, Russia
(and Syria) have opposed this Mechanism on the basis that it was
granted powers prosecutorial in nature’, which the General Assem-
bly does not itself possess. Thus, Russia claimed that the General
Assembly acted ultra vires – going beyond its powers’ as set out in the
UN Charter.110 This is incorrect because the powers of the Mecha-
nism do not include the prosecution of anyone and cannot, therefore,
107 Ibid.
108 The General Assembly has limited powers under the UN Charter Arts 10, 11,
13, and 22. See B Simma, et al., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary,
2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2002) 427–428; LM Goodrich, et al., Charter of
the United Nations, 3rd edn (Columbia University Press, 1969) 191; A Whiting, An
Investigation Mechanism for Syria: The General Assembly Steps into the Breach’
(2017) 15(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/
mqx008; C Wenaweser and J Cockayne, Justice for Syria?: The International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism and the Emergence of the UN General
Assembly in the Realm of International Criminal Justice’(2017) 15(2) Journal of
International Criminal Justice,https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqx010.
109 See eg the following GA resolutions: Resolution 3 (13 February 1946); Reso-
lution 95 (11 December 1946); Resolution 3074 (3 December 1973); Resolution 52/
135 (12 December 1997); Resolution 57/228(B) (22 May 2003); Resolution 60/147 (16
December 2005); Resolution 63/19 (16 December 2008).
110 Note Verbale dated 8 February 2017 from the Permanent Mission of the
Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General, UN
Doc A/71/793, 14 February 2017; General Assembly, 66th Plenary Meeting, 21
December 2017, Official Records, A/71/PV.66, at 21–23.
MANISULI SSENYONJO
be considered as being prosecutorial in nature’. Accordingly, the
opposition to the Mechanism is political rather than strictly legal. The
Mechanism is an important step in the promotion of the principle of
accountability for international crimes. This is because it provides a
way to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse’ evidence of crimes
to criminal law standards (identifying perpetrators for possible future
prosecution) where there exists political resistance preventing any
international tribunal from investigating and prosecuting crimes
committed in Syria.111 This increases the prospects of future
accountability and justice for Syria since the Mechanism is aimed at
assisting any recognised exercise of criminal jurisdiction, whether by
Syria, any other state, or competent international or regional court/
tribunal. It also presents an important precedent for future situations
faced with a political impasse within the Security Council.
2.2.3 Has the ICC Unfairly Focused on Africa?
Credibility of a judicial institution, like the ICC, depends in part on
its independence and its performance. While it is true that the ICC’s
first active investigations and prosecutions were exclusively in Afri-
ca,112 three observations must be noted. First, five African situations
– Central African Republic (CAR), Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Uganda – were self-re-
ferrals’ brought voluntarily to the ICC by concerned African states so
that the Court can investigate and prosecute domestic leaders/com-
manders of rebel groups in Africa. Both the Union of the Comoros
(Comoros) and Gabon have also referred situations on their terri-
tories to the ICC. While a state party to the Rome Statute may refer
to the ICC Prosecutor for investigation a situation in which one or
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been
committed’ (in any other ICC state party),113 with the exception of
111 See Report of the Secretary General: Implementation of the Resolution
Establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in
the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious
Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since
March 2011, A/71/755, 19 January 2017.
112 The Office of the ICC Prosecutor has carried out investigations in Uganda
(since 2004), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, since 2004), Darfur in
Sudan (since 2005), the Central African Republic (CAR, since 2007), Kenya (since
2010), Libya (since 2011), Côte d’Ivoire (since 2011), Mali (since 2013), and another
situation in CAR (since 2014). See ICC, Situations under Investigation, https://www.
icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx.
113 Rome Statute (n 1), Arts 13(b) and 14.
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the Comoros114 no African state has ever referred or attempted to
refer any situation outside Africa to the ICC for investigation. States
have only made so-called self-referrals’ because they contemplated
the territory of the referring state generally targeting armed rebel
groups. The self-referral’ of African situations to the ICC by African
states cannot be blamed on the ICC. African ICC member states that
have complained of Africa-bias could have taken appropriate mea-
sures to remedy this claim by referring other (non-African) situations
to the Court.
Second, the ICC Prosecutor’s exercise of proprio motu powers in
Kenya was based on information provided by Kofi Annan, the
Chairman of the African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African
Personalities115 following the report of an Independent Commission
of Inquiry (also known as Waki Commission, after its President,
Justice Philip Waki).116 In any case, when the ICC found at the trial
stage that the evidence against Kenyatta and Ruto was insufficient,
charges were respectively withdrawn or vacated.117 Notably, the
exercise of proprio motu powers in Cote d’Ivoire was upon voluntary
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 12(3) of the
Rome Statute by the government.118 In both situations in Kenya and
Cote d’Ivoire, the Pre-Trial Chambers of the Court independently
114 The Comoros referral concerns an investigation of the situation on certain
registered vessels (over crimes allegedly committed on board), registered respectively
in the Comoros (the Mavi Marmara), Cambodia (the Rachel Corrie) and Greece (the
Eleftheri Mesogios/Sofia). See ICC, Preliminary Examination: Registered Vessels of
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, https://www.icc-cpi.int/comoros.
115 ICC, ICC Prosecutor Receives Sealed Envelope from Kofi Annan on Post-
Election Violence in Kenya’ (9 July 2009) Press Release No ICC-OTP-20090709-
PR436.
116 See Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence (2008) 18,
472–475; M Ssenyonjo, Analysing the Impact of the International Criminal Court
Investigations and Prosecutions of Kenya’s Serving Senior State Officials’ (2014)1(1)
State Practice & International Law Journal 17.
117 See The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on the withdrawal of
charges against Mr Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-1005, 13 March 2015; and The
Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Defence
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ICC-01/09-01/11, 5 April 2016.
118 See ICC, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/cdi. Côte d’Ivoire was not a state party to the Rome Statute at the time but
accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC on 18 April 2003; and on both 14 December
2010 and 3 May 2011, the Presidency of Côte d’Ivoire reconfirmed Côte d’Ivoire’s
acceptance of this jurisdiction. On 15 February 2013, Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome
Statute.
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concurred with the Office of the Prosecutor and authorised the
commencement of the investigations.119 In all African situations be-
fore the ICC, the ICC has acted to hold accountable perpetrators of
the crimes for the benefit of African victims of alleged crimes that
African states were unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute.
This contributes to lasting peace, security and stability in Africa. All
ICC judicial decisions from the authorisation of investigations to the
confirmation or non-confirmation of charges and decisions on guilt
or innocence are and have been taken independently on the basis of
the law and the available evidence and are not based on regional or
ethnic considerations’.120
Third, the Prosecutor has since made good progress by investi-
gating situations outside Africa as reflected in an investigation
opened in Georgia in 2016.121 In addition, although in the past the
Prosecutor decided not to proceed in certain politically complex non-
African situations, such as with Iraq, Korea, Palestine and Vene-
zuela, on the basis that the legal criteria under Article 53 was not met,
there has been a change in approach. At the time of writing, the
Prosecutor’s was carrying out preliminary examinations in non-
African situations including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq (UK mili-
tary intervention in Iraq), Palestine, Registered vessels of Greece and
Cambodia, and Ukraine.122 Such recent developments indicate that
the Prosecutor is willing to investigate non-African situations. In this
context the Prosecutor’s announcement to reach a final determination
with respect to the situation in Afghanistan and the Comoros referral
is to be welcomed.123 It should be noted, however, that many pre-
liminary examinations are mired in delays.
119 See Rome Statute (n 1), Art 15; Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the
Republic of Kenya: Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09, 31 March 2010; Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Republic of Cote
D’ivoire: Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11, 3
October 2011.
120 See Statement by the ICC Presidency (n 76).
121 Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Situation in Georgia: Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request
for Authorization of an Investigation, No. ICC-01/15, 27 January 2016.
122 ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activ-




2.2.4 The ICC’s Performance and Budget in the Last 14 Years
Another element advanced to demonstrate the ICC’s lack of credi-
bility is based on the assessment of the ICC’s performance during the
last 14 years. The Court delivered its first judgment after a decade in
existence on 14 March 2012 convicting Congolese militia leader
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of the war crimes of enlisting and con-
scripting children under the age of 15 years and using them to par-
ticipate actively in hostilities.124 Since the first ICC Prosecutor’s
mandate began in mid-2003 up to the end of 2016, the Prosecutor had
only been able to prosecute African non-state actors leading to 9
convictions by the Court in the following cases (Lubanga,125
Katanga,126 Bemba et al.127 and Al Mahdi128) and 1 acquittal129 at a
124 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of
the Statute, No. ICC-01/04-01/06, 14 March 2012. He was sentenced to a total of
14 years of imprisonment on 10 July 2012, and this was confirmed by Appeals
Chamber on 1 December 2014.
125 Ibid.
126 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014. He was found guilty, on 7 March 2014, as
an accessory to one count of a crime against humanity (murder) and four counts of
war crimes (murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of property and
pillaging) committed on 24 February 2003 during the attack on the village of Bo-
goro, in the Ituri district of the DRC. He was sentenced to a total of 12 years’
imprisonment.
127 The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-
Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido, ICC-01/05-
01/13; The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74
of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016. Trial Chamber III found Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo guilty under Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute, as a person
effectively acting as a military commander, of the crimes of crimes against humanity
(murder and rape) and war crimes (murder, rape and pillaging). He was sentenced to
18 years of imprisonment on 21 June 2016.
128 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence, ICC-01/
12-01/15, 27 September 2016. Al Mahdi was found guilty of the crime of inten-
tionally directing attacks against protected objects, alleged to have been committed
between 30 June 2012 and 11 July 2012 in Timbuktu, Mali, against 10 sites of a
religious and historic character. He was sentenced to 9 years.
129 The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal
against the decision of Trial Chamber II entitled ‘‘Judgment pursuant to article 74 of
the Statute’’, ICC-01/04-02/12 A (7 April 2015). On 18 December 2012, Trial
Chamber II acquitted Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui of the charges of war crimes and
crimes against humanity and ordered his immediate release. The Prosecution ap-
pealed the verdict on 20 December 2012. On 27 February 2015, the verdict was
upheld by the Appeals Chamber.
MANISULI SSENYONJO
cost of over one billion US dollars, making the ICC one of the most
expensive courts in the world.130 At the time of writing, there were
three ongoing cases at the trial stage involving former warlords from
the DRC131 and Uganda,132 as well as the ex-President of Cote
d’Ivoire.133
With the exception of Al Mahdi trial which was completed within
less than 1 year (because the accused pleaded guilty),134 the trials of
Lubanga and Katanga took over 5 years between the confirmation of
charges and the convictions.135
With staff of over 800 staff members,136 the Court’s approved
annual budget in 2016 was e136,585,100 and several contributions
were outstanding.137 As of 15 September 2016 the total outstanding
contributions, including the regular budget, the Contingency Fund
and interest on the host State loan, stood at e34,163,902.138 The
growing number of preliminary examinations, investigations and
prosecutions would require more resources. The Court’s 2017 pro-
gramme budget was approved at e144,587,300.139 Despite such a
huge budget, the ICC has been able to convict only non-state actors.
130 e1,479,301, 700 has been spent on the ICC between 2002 and 2016 to secure
four convictions only (eight if Article 70 convictions are added). See Statement by the
Russian Foreign Ministry on signing the Decree On the intention not to become a
party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ (17 November 2016),
http://www.rusemb.org.uk/fnapr/5869; D Davenport, International Criminal Court:
12 Years, $1 Billion, 2 Convictions (12 March 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
daviddavenport/2014/03/12/international-criminal-court-12-years-1-billion-2-convic
tions-2/#274232456440. The Court currently has 34 judges and over 700 staff.
131 The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06.
132 The Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15.
133 The Prosecutor v Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15.
134 The Prosecutor v Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (n 128).
135 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (n 124); and The Prosecutor v Germain
Katanga (n 126).
136 ICC, Facts and Figures, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about.
137 Assembly of State Parties, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on
the work of its twenty-seventh session, ICC-ASP/15/15 (28 October 2016), https://asp.
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP15/ICC-ASP-15-15-ENG.pdf, paras 16(a)-21.
138 Ibid., para 22.
139 See Resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the proposed programme
budget for 2017, the Working Capital Fund for 2017, the scale of assessment for the
apportionment of expenses of the International Criminal Court, financing appro-
priations for 2017 and the Contingency Fund, ICC-ASP/15/Res.1, at 1.
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The main case against a serving head of state arising out of the UN
Security Council referral (Al Bashir of Sudan) stalled primarily due to
the Council’s failure to put pressure on Sudan to cooperate fully with
the Court or to surrender Al Bashir to the Court, thus undermining
the ICC’s investigations.140 All the five suspects141 against whom ICC
arrest warrants were issued in the situation in Darfur remain at large
in Sudan nearly a decade later after the first warrant was issued pri-
marily due to the Security Council’s lack of robust, swift and concrete
action after the referral to induce Sudan and other States to execute
the arrest warrants.142 This has emboldened Al Bashir to travel to
both ICC state and non-state parties as well as emboldening states to
continue to host him.143 As noted by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II:
In the absence of follow-up actions on the part of the Security Council, any
referral to the Court under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter would
become futile and incapable of achieving its ultimate goal of putting an end to
impunity.144
Cases arising out of the exercise of the Prosecutor’s proprio motu
powers in Kenya have been met by fierce resistance in the form of
non-cooperation and witness interference (leading to the withdrawal
or vacation of charges against senior State officials – Uhuru Muigai
Kenyatta and William Samoei Ruto of Kenya).145 Nevertheless, it
140 See UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and
South Sudan, UN Doc S/PV.7337 (12 December 2014), 2.
141 The suspects are Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Ahmad Muhammad Harun,
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein and
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain.
142 See Twenty-fourth report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the United Nations Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 13
December 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/161213-otp-rep-24-darfur_
Eng.pdf.
143 Ibid., paras 9–22.
144 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 July
2016, Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the request to
arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the
United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome
Statute, para 16. See also Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Dji-
bouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and
referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the
State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09, 11 July 2016 para 17.
145 See The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, (n 117); and The Prosecutor v
William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang (n 117).
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must be acknowledged that during its first 16 years the ICC has
established itself as a functioning institution with investigations, ar-
rests, trials, convictions, acquittals and appeals. As at the time of
writing in January 2017, the Court had three trials running, one of
which was expected to be completed in 2018 and the other two in
2019 but there were no cases at the pre-trial stage.146
An increase in the number of situations and cases before the ICC
means that that there will be an increase in the Court’s workload/
activities (e.g. outreach and public information, investigations, legal
aid for victims and accused, trial preparation, funds for victims) and
long-term spending pattern of the ICC over the years.147 Unlike other
international criminal tribunals created in recent decades with limited
temporal and geographical jurisdiction,148 the ICC is a permanent
court whose membership has been growing over the years. This re-
quires increased prioritisation in the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion and improvement in the quality and efficiency of the Court’s
core activities including preliminary examinations, investigations,
analysis, trials and appeals.149
2.3 UN Security Council’s Failure to Defer Investigation or Prosecu-
tion
Another reason advanced by South Africa for its withdrawal notifi-
cation from the Rome Statute is that: The Security Council has also
not played its part in terms of Article 16 of the Rome Statute where
the involvement of the ICC will pose a threat to peace and security on
146 See The Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15; The Prosecutor v
Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15; The Prosecutor v Bosco
Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06.
147 S Ford, How Much Money Does the ICC Need?’ in Stahn (n 86) 84–104.
148 Such tribunals include: the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia; International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda; the Extraordinary Chamber in the Courts of Cambodia;, and the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. See S Ford, How Leadership in International
Criminal Law is Shifting from the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of
Spending on and Contributions to International Criminal Courts’ (2011) 55 Saint
Louis University Law Journal 953.
149 See Office of The Prosecutor, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation
(15 September 2016) https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20160915_OTP-Pol
icy_Case-Selection_Eng.pdf; The Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office
of the Prosecutor, ICC-ASP/14/21 (17 September 2015).
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the African continent’.150 Although South Africa did not provide
further details, its claim is based on the failure of the UN Security
Council to defer situations in Darfur and Kenya with specific refer-
ence to cases arising from those situations concerning some prose-
cution of African heads of state. In 2008 when the ICC Prosecutor
announced that he was seeking an arrest warrant against President Al
Bashir of Sudan, the AU called upon the Security Council to apply
Article 16 of the Rome Statute and defer the process [proceedings]
initiated by the ICC’ for a period of 12 months.151
A similar request was made in 2013 to defer the investigation and
prosecution against Kenya’s President Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and
Deputy President William Samoei Ruto.152 However, the Security
Council did not adopt any resolution on the basis of Article 16 to
defer investigations/prosecutions in both Darfur and Kenya.153
Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides for the deferral of investi-
gation or prosecution by the UN Security Council when political and
conflict resolution imperatives (the maintenance of international
150 Declaratory Statement (n 27).
151 See, eg, African Union Peace and Security Council Decision, PSC/MIN/Comm
(CXLII), 21 July 2008 paras 3, 5, 9, 11(i); African Union Peace and Security Council
Decision, PSC/PR/Comm (CLXXV), 5 March 2009, paras 4–6; African Union
Decision on the Application by the ICC Prosecutor for the Indictment of the Pres-
ident of the Republic of the Sudan, Dec.221(XII), 3 February 2009, paras 2–3;
African Union Decision on the Meeting of the African States Parties to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Doc.Assembly/AU/13(xiii),
Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) Rev.1, 1–3 July 2009, para 9; Decision on the Imple-
mentation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, Doc. EX.CL/
639(XVIII), Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI), 30–31 January 2011, para 3.
152 See, eg, Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Imple-
mentation of Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) – Doc.
Assembly/AU/18(XXIV), Assembly/AU/Dec.547(XXIV), 30–31 January 2015,
paras 3 and 17(d); Decision on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/
952(XXVIII),Assembly/AU/Dec.590(XXVI), 30–31 January 2016, para 2(ii); Deci-
sion on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court
(ICC) – Doc. EX.CL/639(XVIII),Assembly/AU/Dec.334(XVI), 30–31 January 2011,
para 6; Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International
Criminal Court (ICC) – Doc. EX.CL/731(XXI),Assembly/AU/Dec.419 (xix), 15–16
July 2012, para 4; Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal
Court (ICC), Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 (October 2013) para 10(i), (ii), (xi); UNSC
Draft Resolution Seeking Deferral of Kenyan Leaders’ Trial Fails to Win Adoption,
with 7 Voting in Favour, 8 Abstaining, SC/11176 (15 November 2013), http://www.
un.org/press/en/2013/sc11176.doc.htm.
153 See UN Doc. S/RES/1828 (2008); UN Doc. S/PV.7060, p. 2.
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peace and security) would make it necessary to delay international
criminal justice (ICC investigation or prosecution). Article 16 reads:
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a reso-
lution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has
requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council
under the same conditions.
Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the Security Council is
empowered to determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression’ and to make recommenda-
tions, or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore
international peace and security’.154 The travaux préparatoires of
Article 16 indicates that the relationship between the Court and the
Security Council was very contentious.155 The content of the current
Article 16 of the Rome Statute was introduced by Singapore156 as a
means of ensuring that politically motivated actions [referrals] by
States Parties or by the Prosecutor that might contradict Security
Council aims could be suspended or terminated indefinitely by the
Security Council acting under its Chapter VII authority’.157 It was thus
intended to be used on a case-by-case basis by reference to particular
situations, so as to enable the Security Council to advance the interests
of peace where there might be a temporary conflict between the reso-
lution of armed conflict, on the one hand, and the prosecution of of-
fences, on the other’.158 It was not intended to defer situations referred
by the SecurityCouncil and the cases that arise from it since theCouncil
has established that international criminal prosecutions contribute to
the restoration and maintenance of peace’.159 Despite its adoption,
154 UN Charter (n 49), Art 39.
155 Clark (n 7), 770–780.
156 See Proposal by Singapore on article 23, Non-Paper/WG. 3/No. 16 (8 August
1997).
157 D Scheffer, Three Realities About African Situation at the International
Criminal Court’ ICC Forum (November 2016), http://iccforum.com/withdrawal.
158 See UN Security Council, 4568th Meeting, 10 July 2002, statement by Per-
manent Representative of New Zealand, Mr. MacKay, UN Doc S/PV.4568, p. 5,
http://www.un.org/Docs/pv4568e.pdf.
159 See, eg, UN Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/RES/808, 22 February
1993, preamble para 9; UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993), S/RES/827, 25
May 1993, preamble, para 6; and UN Security Council Resolution 955 (1994),
S/RES/955, 8 November 1994, preamble para 7.
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many states considered that it was anunacceptable encroachment upon
judicial independence. As yet, the Court has not yet interpreted the
scope of Article 16 but the Security Council has used it in two resolu-
tions to protect officials or personnel of the Security Council members
and their close allies.160
Following the failure of the UN Security Council to defer the
investigations or prosecutions in African situations in particular those
relating to heads of states in Darfur/Sudan andKenya, as requested by
theAU, SouthAfrica, acting on behalf ofAUState Parties to theRome
Statute, proposed, some amendments to the Statute. This was made in
accordance with Article 121(1) of the Rome Statute. It specifically
proposed an amendment toArticle 16 in order to allow theUNGeneral
Assembly to exercise deferral powers when the Security Council fails to
act.161 South Africa’s proposal provided for the addition of the fol-
lowing paragraphs to the current Article 16:
(2)AStatewith jurisdiction over a situationbefore theCourtmay request theUN
SecurityCouncil to defer thematter before theCourt as provided for in (1) above.
(3) Where the UN Security Council fails to decide on the request by the state
concerned within six (6) months of receipt of the request, the requesting Party
may request the UN General Assembly to assume the Security Council’s
responsibility under paragraph 1 consistent with Resolution 377 (v) of the UN
General Assembly.162
The above proposal was not adopted since it raised several questions
with regard to the relationship between the UN Security Council and
the UN General Assembly as well as the relationship between the
ICC and the UN.163
2.4 Conflicting International Law Obligations
Another reason advanced for South Africa’s withdrawal notification
from the ICC is that the Rome Statute has been interpreted in a
160 See SC Resolution 1422 (12 July 2002), UN Doc S/RES/1422 (2002); SC Res-
olution 1487 (12 June 2003) UN Doc S/RES/1487 (12 June 2003); Amnesty Interna-
tional, The Unlawful Attempt by the Security Council to give US Citizens permanent
Impunity from International Justice’, AI Index IOR 40/006/2003 (May 2003).
161 Report of the Working Group on the Review Conference, ICC-ASP/8/20,
Annex II, para 59.
162 UN Depositary Notification C.N.851.2009.TREATIES-10 of 30 November
2009 (South Africa: Proposal of Amendment).
163 Report of the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-ASP/13/31, para 9 and
ICC-ASP/14/34, para 17.
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manner that has led to conflicting international law obligations’.164
In particular, South Africa’s Minister of Justice stated that the Rome
Statute compel ICC state parties including South Africa to arrest
persons who may enjoy diplomatic immunity under customary
international law who are wanted by the court’.165 In effect the claim
here is that compliance with the Rome Statute would lead to a breach
of obligations to other states. The alleged obligations relate to whe-
ther or not a head of state non-party to the Rome Statute (in par-
ticular, President Al Bashir of Sudan subject to two ICC arrest
warrants for crimes against humanity and genocide) enjoys immu-
nities ratione personae from arrest and surrender to the ICC.166
On 4 March 2009, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I (composed of Judge
Akua Kuenyehia, Presiding Judge, Judge Anita Usacka, and Judge
Sylvia Steiner) stated that the current position of Omar Al Bashir as
Head of a state which is not a party to the Statute, has no effect on
the Court’s jurisdiction over the present case’.167 This determination
was based on four considerations namely the goal of ending impunity
for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes as stated in the Rome
Statute’s preamble; Article 27 of the Statute; the law applicable was
the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence; and the effect of the Security Council.168 The Chamber
stated that:
…by referring the Darfur situation to the Court, pursuant to article 13(b) of
the Statute, the Security Council of the United Nations has also accepted that
the investigation into the said situation, as well as any prosecution arising
therefrom, will take place in accordance with the statutory framework pro-
vided for in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and the Rules as a whole.169
The Chamber decided that the Registry prepare a request for
cooperation seeking the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir’ to
the ICC. Accordingly the Registry requested all ICC state parties to
164 See South Africa’s Declaratory statement’ (n 27), 2.
165 See South African Government News Agency, SA Formally Withdrawing
from ICC’ 21 October 2016, http://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-formally-
withdrawing-icc.
166 See Pre-Trial Chamber I (n 17).
167 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3 (4 March
2009), Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, para 41.
168 Ibid., paras 42–45.
169 Ibid., para 45.
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arrest and surrender Al Bashir.170 This was done without considering
whether such a request would, under Article 98 of the Rome Statute,
be inconsistent with the requested state’s obligations under (cus-
tomary) international law with respect to the head of state immunity
of Al Bashir.
Following the failure of some ICC state parties to arrest President
Al Bashir on numerous international visits to African ICC States
parties (including Malawi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC), Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and South Africa), the ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber interpreted the Rome Statute as imposing an obli-
gation on state parties to arrest Al Bashir because of two reasons.
First, the Chamber rejected the argument presented by Malawi,
with respect to states not parties to the Rome Statute, that interna-
tional law affords immunity to Heads of States in respect of pro-
ceedings before international courts’.171 It claimed that customary
international law creates an exception to Head of State immunity
when international courts seek a Head of State’s arrest for the
commission of international crimes’.172 Although this position was
re-stated in a decision concerning the Republic of Chad,173 the
Chamber did not provide satisfactory evidence to support this
view.174 It is correct to state that the immunity for Heads of State
before international courts has been rejected time and time again
dating all the way back to World War 1’.175 This was the case with
the practice of the Nuremberg Tribunals, the Tokyo Tribunals, the
170 See The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-7,
Request to All States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of
Omar Al Bashir (11 March 2009); ICC-02/05-01/09-96, Supplementary Request to
All States Parties to the Rome Statute for the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir (21 July 2010).
171 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (12
December 2011), Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the
Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued
by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir (Malawi Decision), para 18.
172 Ibid., para 43.
173 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (13
December 2011), Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the
refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by
the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al
Bashir, para 13.
174 See Malawi Decision (n 171), paras 22–43.
175 Ibid., para 38.
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ICTY, the ICTR, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Leba-
non Tribunals. However, there is no evidence to show that this
practice is generally accepted as law’ (opinio juris) in order to
transform it into a rule of customary international law,176 and none
was presented by the ICC in the Malawi and Chad decisions.177
Accordingly, it was not proved that customary international law re-
quires or rejects immunity before international courts and tribunals.
Second, the Chamber held that by virtue of the language used in
paragraph 2 of Security Council (SC) Resolution 1593(2005),178 the
SC implicitly waived the immunities granted to Omar Al Bashir
under international law and attached to his position as a Head of
State’.179 Thus South Africa was under the duty under the Rome
Statute to immediately arrest Omar Al-Bashir and surrender him to
the Court’ during Al Bashir’s presence in South Africa.180
According to South Africa arresting senior state officials such as
African heads of state or ministers who are subject to ICC arrest
warrants makes it impossible to participate in the peaceful resolution
of conflicts.181Yet negotiation of peace agreements (to end armed
conflicts, which so often unleashes serious crimes) may require the
participation of African heads of state or senior ministers who
are subject of ICC arrest warrants. Accordingly, South Africa
claimed that to continue to be a State Party to the Rome Statute will
176 See the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixty-
Sixth Session (5 May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2014), General Assembly Official
Records Sixty-ninth Session Supplement No. 10 (A/69/10), Chap 10, paras 169–171.
177 See D Tladi, The ICC Decisions in Chad and Malawi: on Cooperation,
Immunities, and Article 98’ (2013) 11(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice
199.
178 UN SC Resolution 1593(2005) para 2. The SC decided that the Government of
Sudan […] shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the
Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution’.
179 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (9 April
2014), Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, para 29.
180 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09 (13 June
2015), Decision following the Prosecutor’s request for an order further clarifying that
the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and
surrender Omar Al Bashir, para 10.
181 See South Africa’s Instrument of Withdrawal’, 19 October 2016 (on file with
author).
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compromise its efforts to promote peace and security on the African
Continent’.182
The claim here is that the interpretation given to Articles 27 and 98
of the Rome statute compel South Africa (in particular in situations
referred to the Court by the Security Council) to arrest persons in
South Africa including serving heads of states of foreign states sub-
ject to ICC warrants who may enjoy diplomatic immunity under
customary international law, and to surrender those persons to the
International Criminal Court, even under circumstances where the
Republic of South Africa is actively involved in promoting peace,
stability and dialogue in those countries’.183 According to South
Africa, arrest of such a person by a State Party pursuant to its Rome
Statute obligations, may therefore result in a violation of its cus-
tomary international law obligations’ on diplomatic immunity or
head of state immunity.184 In South Africa’s view, this immunity is
necessary in order to effectively promote dialogue and the peaceful
resolution of conflicts wherever they may occur’.185
It should be noted that according to Article 25 of the UN Charter
the UN members agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council’ in accordance with the Charter.186 Therefore, when
the Security Council adopts a decision under article 25 in accordance
with the Charter, it is for member States to comply with that deci-
sion’.187 This includes decisions concerning referrals to the ICC
including Council decisions that ICC state parties cooperate fully’
with the Court. In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the UN members under the UN Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement including the Rome Statute, their
obligations under the UN Charter shall prevail’.188 In effect UN
182 Declaratory Statement (n 27).
183 Memorandum on the Objects of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill, 2016, http://www.parliament.gov.
za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20161111/616356_1.pdf, para 1.2.
184 Declaratory Statement (n 27).
185 Memorandum (n 183), para 1.3.
186 UN Charter (n 49), Art 25.
187 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970), ICJ Advisory Opinion, 21 June 1971 (1971) ICJ Reports 16, para 116, http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf.
188 UN Charter (n 49), Art 103.
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member states, including non-state parties to the Rome Statute, are
by virtue of Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter obliged to comply
with the decisions of the UN Security Council arising from resolu-
tions of the UN Security Council Chapter VII referral of situations to
the ICC.
Does the Rome Statute require ICC state parties to act in a vio-
lation of customary international law of immunity to a serving head
of state (from arrest and surrender)? Immunity provisions under
Articles 27 and 98, interpreted in accordance with the object and
purpose of the Rome Statute, do not lead to violation of customary
international law. Article 27 aims at eliminating impunity by pro-
viding that immunity is not a bar to the Court’s jurisdiction:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based
on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or
Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected represen-
tative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a
ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.
The removal of immunity under Article 27 applies to officials of state
parties to the Rome Statute and not to non-state parties to the Rome
Statute. This is because a treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it’ and such a treaty does not create either rights or obligations for
a third state’.189 Therefore, Article 98(1) protects state sovereignty by
recognising customary international law rules concerning state or
diplomatic immunities reflected in an exemption from arrest and
surrender of a person or property of a non-state party to the Rome
Statute. It provides that:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
189 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Arts 26 and
34.
STATE WITHDRAWAL NOTIFICATIONS
Clearly, Article 98(1) limits the avenues for surrendering individuals
or property of a third state’190 to the ICC that are entitled to
immunity principally under customary international law.191
Some African ICC states parties (Malawi,192 Chad,193 DRC194
and South Africa195) refused to arrest and surrender President Omar
Al Bashir of Sudan during his presence in respective states partly on
the basis that complying with the ICC requests would require vio-
lation of head of state immunities under customary international law.
In its decisions on Malawi and Chad, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
(composed of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, Presiding Judge,
Judge Sylvia Steiner, and Judge Cuno Tarfusser), in December 2011,
accepted that there is an inherent tension between articles 27(2) and
98(1) of the [Rome] Statute and the role immunity plays when the
Court seeks cooperation regarding the arrest of a Head of State’.196
The Chamber went on to observe that Article 98(1) was not appli-
cable because customary international law creates an exception to
Heads of State immunity when international courts seek a Head of
State’s arrest for the commission of international crimes’.197 The
Court stated that the unavailability of immunities with respect to
190 Ibid., Arts 2(1)(h), 34–38. The term third state’ means a State not a party to
the treaty’. In the context of cooperation treaties it is used to refer to a state that is a
third party to the cooperation request. Under Article 98 of the Rome Statute a third
state’ could refer to any other state that still has immunities.
191 For a commentary on Article 98 see WA Schabas, The International Criminal
Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2016)
1342–1353, at 1346.
192 Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the
Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court
with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-
02/05-01/09-139, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 12 December 2011.
193 Decision pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the
Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with
respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-
01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 December 2011.
194 Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-01/09,
Pre-Trial Chamber I, 9 April 2014.
195 Decision following the Prosecutor’s request for an order further clarifying that
the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and
surrender Omar Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 13 June 2015.
196 Malawi Decision (n 192), para 37.
197 Ibid., paras 42–43.
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prosecution applies to cooperation’198 and that to interpret Article
98(1) as allowing the requested states to refuse to arrest and surrender
heads of state would disable the Court and the international criminal
justice’.199
Despite the above observations, the Court did not give an inter-
pretation of Article 98(1). It, therefore, did not address the tension’
between Articles 27(2) and 98(1) but based its decision on Article 27,
while ignoring completely the need to interpret Article 98(1) as if it
was not part of the Rome Statute. If immunity under customary
international law does not exist when the ICC seeks arrest of a person
entitled to immunity (e.g. a head of a non-state party to the Rome
Statute) for the commission of international crimes, then Article 98 is
effectively redundant. In 2014 the Pre-Trial Chamber (with two new
judges who did not participate in Malawi and Chad decisions)200
attempted to address the scope of Article 98(1) by noting that:
it is not disputed that under international law a sitting Head of State enjoys
personal immunities from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability before na-
tional courts of foreign States even when suspected of having committed one or
more of the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Such personal
immunities are ensured under international law for the purpose of the effective
performance of the functions of sitting Heads of States. This view has also been
supported by the International Court of Justice (the ‘‘ICJ’’).201 An exception to
the personal immunities of Heads of States is explicitly provided in article 27(2)
of the Statute for prosecution before an international criminal jurisdiction.
According to this provision, the existence of personal immunities under
international law which generally attach to the official capacity of the person
‘‘shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person’’.202
The Chamber correctly noted that Article 27(2) should in principle,
be confined to those State Parties who have accepted it’.203 Therefore,
the Chamber accepted that when the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Court entails the prosecution of a Head of State of a non-State Party,
198 Ibid., para 44.
199 Ibid., para 41.
200 The Chamber was composed of Judge Ekaterina Trendafilova, Presiding Judge
Judge, Hans-Peter Kaul and Judge Cuno Tarfusser (who participated in the deci-
sions concerning Malawi and Chad).
201 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, 14 February 2002 (2002) ICJ Reports 3, paras 53–
59, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.
202 DRC Decision (n 194), para 25.
203 Ibid., para 26.
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the question of personal immunities might validly arise. The solution
provided for in the Statute to resolve such a conflict is found in article
98(1) of the Statute’.204 Accordingly, in a case dealing with a head of
state not party to the Rome Statute, who is wanted by the ICC, and
where there is no relevant Security Council referral or binding treaty
removing immunity, immunity ought to continue to be given effect to
in the light of the position under customary international law.
However, according to the Chamber, the Security Council im-
plicitly waived’ the immunities granted to Omar Al Bashir under
international law and attached to his position as a head of state by
virtue of SC Resolution 1593 (2005) for the purpose of the pro-
ceedings before the Court.205 It follows that under customary inter-
national law, a head of state does not possess immunity in cases
where that immunity has been waived or removed either implicitly or
explicitly by the Security Council or treaty such as the Genocide
Convention206 to which a state is a party. Consequently, the Security
Council referral has the effect of making the Rome Statute (including
Article 27) applicable to non-state parties and removes immunity in
that situation. It is essential for the Security Council, when it makes a
Chapter VII referral with regards to a situation concerning a non-
party to the Rome Statute, to explicitly waive immunities and to
impose clear obligations of cooperation in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Rome Statute on that non-party and ICC state parties.
Since the UN Security Council imposed an obligation on Sudan, that
Sudan shall cooperate fully’, presumably that imposes all the coop-
204 Ibid., para 27.
205 Ibid., para 29; and South Africa decision (n 195), paras 6–7 (Judge Cuno
Tarfusser, Presiding Judge). The Chamber relied on SC Resolution 1593 (2005) para
2 which: Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict
in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the
Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that
States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all
States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate
fully’. See also D Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the
ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir Immunities’ (2009) 7(2) Journal of International
Criminal Justice 333–352; D Akande, The Effect of Security Council Resolutions
and Domestic Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC’ (2012)
10(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 299–324.
206 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
78 UNTS 277, entered into force 12 January 1951, Art IV provides: Persons com-
mitting genocide … shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private individuals’.
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eration obligations in part 9 of the Rome Statute. In this regard, the
non-state party has an international law obligation to cooperate with
the Court arising under the UN Charter. As noted above, this obli-
gation prevails over any other treaty obligation. Therefore, in such a
case there is no violation of customary international law immunity
(from arrest in states cooperating with the ICC) and thus no con-
flicting international law obligations arise. State parties to the Rome
Statute remain obliged to cooperate with the Court as parties to the
Rome Statute, rather than on the basis of the UN Charter.
III IMPACT OF THE WITHDRAWAL NOTIFICATIONS BY
SOUTH AFRICA, BURUNDI AND THE GAMBIA
The general effect of withdrawal is that, subject to Article 127(2), a
withdrawing state will no longer be a party to and bound by the
Rome Statute once withdrawal becomes effective.207 As a matter of
law, withdrawal has no impact on a withdrawing state obligations (to
cooperate with the Court in connection with criminal investigations
and proceedings), including any financial obligations which may have
accrued, under the Rome Statute prior to the date on which the
withdrawal becomes effective.208 It follows that breaches of the Rome
Statute committed prior to withdrawal on a state’s territory (such as
South Africa’s failure to arrest and surrender Al Bashir) or by a
withdrawing state’s national would still fall within the Court’s
jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that investigations had not yet
been concluded and prosecutions had not yet been conducted before
the withdrawal.209 In this regard the Prosecutor should conclude
whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation
and if so submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorisation
of an investigation in Burundi formally in good time before 27
October 2017, the effective date of withdrawal. In accordance with
Articles 15 and 53 of the Rome Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber
should consider whether to authorise the opening of an investigation
in Burundi before the date of withdrawal becomes effective.
Similarly, withdrawal does not affect a state’s other obligations
under international treaties or customary international law since it is
207 See n 9 above.
208 Rome Statute (n 1), Art 127(2); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n
189), Art 70(1)(b).
209 Clark (n 7), 2324.
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settled law that the withdrawal of a party from a treaty shall not in
any way impair the duty of any State to fulfil any obligation
embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under interna-
tional law independently of the treaty’.210 This means that the obli-
gations of South Africa, Burundi and The Gambia as state parties to
the Genocide Convention are not affected by withdrawing from the
Rome Statute. Withdrawing states still have an implicit obligation’
to cooperate with a competent international penal tribunal’ as may
have jurisdiction over genocide such as the ICC when it is acting by
virtue of a Security Council referral, including an obligation to arrest
persons charged with genocide and surrender them to the ICC for
trial.211
Withdrawal from the ICC intended to avoid accountability may
be costly to poorer developing states in terms of its impact on a state’s
(perceived or real) commitment to international criminal justice. It
may lead to retaliatory measures (such as cutbacks in the EU tech-
nical and financial assistance or international assistance/development
aid).212 Thus, the withdrawal notifications of three African states
have prompted strong statements of support for the Court from a
greater number of African states. State officials of several African
ICC state parties – including Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia –
have reaffirmed their continuous commitment to support and coop-
erate with the ICC.213
African state parties to the Rome Statute are thus widely divided
on the AU’s so-called ICC Withdrawal Strategy’, which does not
really focus on withdrawal but mainly contains constructive non-
210 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 189), Art 43.
211 Genocide Convention (n 206), Art VI; Application of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia
and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007 (2007) ICJ Reports 43, http://www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf, paras 439–447.
212 See The European Union and the International Criminal Court (February 2008),
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC_internet08.pdf, 16.
213 SR Lansky, Africans Speak Out Against ICC Withdrawal: Governments Signal
Continued Support for Court, 2 November 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/
02/africans-speak-out-against-icc-withdrawal; E Keppler, African Members Reaf
firm Support at International Criminal Court Meeting: Countries Commit to
Working Within the ICC System’, 17 November 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/
2016/11/17/african-members-reaffirm-support-international-criminal-court-meeting.
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legally binding ICC reform proposals.214 For example, in January
2017 Nigeria, Senegal, and Cape Verde formally entered reservations
to the AU decision adopted by heads of state which fully supported
the sovereign decisions taken by Burundi, South Africa and The
Gambia as pioneer implementers of the [AU’s ICC] Withdrawal
Strategy’.215 Liberia entered a reservation to the paragraph that
adopts the ICC Withdrawal Strategy’ while Malawi, Tanzania, Tu-
nisia and Zambia requested more time to study the Withdrawal
Strategy’.216 Other non-African states including Canada, Switzerland,
Slovenia, and Czech Republic have affirmed strong support for the
ICC’s mission following South Africa’s withdrawal notification.217
The result of withdrawals could be a Court membership that is slightly
smaller in number but more committed to cooperation with the ICC.
However, it must be noted that withdrawals represent a loss to the
Court and to the victims it serves by limiting the Court’s ability to
investigate and prosecute any future international crimes after the
withdrawal notices come into effect. This is because withdrawing
states will no longer be bound by the Rome Statute including the
obligation to cooperate with the ICC and to arrest and surrender to
the Court persons in respect of whom the ICC has issued an arrest
warrant and a request for assistance’.218 Withdrawals would strip
victims of one of the most important judicial institutions with a
potential to investigate and prosecute international crimes and
potentially allow such crimes to be committed by state officials with
impunity in the future. African victims continue to rely on the ICC to
investigate crimes committed by senior state officials. For example,
on 9 December 2016 some Members of Parliament in Uganda called
214 Decision on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/1006(XXX) (n 8),
para 8 calls on member states to consider implementing its recommendations’. See
also AU, Withdrawal Strategy Document (n 8). The Strategy presents a list of pro-
posed reforms to the Rome Statute and the Court including amendments to the
Rome Statute; reform of the UN Security Council; ratification of the Malabo Pro-
tocol; increasing African representation in the ICC; strengthening national criminal
justice mechanisms; and more engagement with relevant organs – Assembly of State
Parties, Office of the Prosecutor and the UN Security Council.
215 Decision on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/1006(XXX) (n 8),
para 6.
216 Ibid., para 8.
217 R Dicker, Defend the Integrity of the Rome Statute and a Court Worth
Having’ Human Rights and International Criminal Law, http://iccforum.com/with
drawal#Dicker.
218 Minister of Justice v SALC (n 19), para 61.
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for an ICC investigation into the deaths of over 100 people that
allegedly occurred when the Ugandan state security agencies (army
and police) raided the region’s cultural kingdom, Obusinga bwa
Rwenzururu’ king’s palace in Rwenzori sub-region – Kasese in Wes-
tern Uganda on 27 November 2016 and clashed with the Kingdom’s
royal guards.219 Situations for withdrawing states could then only be
brought before the Court if the a relevant state decides to accept ICC
jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis (which is unlikely in situations where
government officials are likely to be investigated) or the UN Security
Council makes a referral.
Furthermore, withdrawal notifications of South Africa, Burundi
and the Gambia have set a precedent for other African and other
states opposed to the ICC to consider withdrawing, or threaten to
withdraw from the Court’s jurisdiction in the future.220 It also creates
some doubt among other states considering a possibility of signing
and ratifying the Rome Statute not to do so in the near future.
Burundi’s withdrawal notification specifically provides a way for ICC
state parties being (or about to be) investigated by the ICC to resist
accountability for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and
aggression by initiating a process of withdrawing from the Rome
Statute. This is likely to be the case if there are no sustained diplo-
matic, political or financial costs to withdrawing from the Rome
Statute. This is particularly the case whenever state officials are op-
posed to being investigated for possible international crimes. This is
confirmed by President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines consid-
eration of withdrawing from the Rome statute to avoid investigations
relating to reported extra-judicial killings of alleged drug dealers and
users in the Philippines.221
219 E Biryabarema. Ugandan MPs Petition ICC to Probe Kasese ‘‘Genocide’’’
The East African, 5 January 2016, http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Uganda-
MPs-petition-ICC-to-probe-Kasese-genocide/2558-3507338-vic0kiz/index.html; Human
Rights Watch, Uganda: Investigate Killings in Rwenzori Region: Cycles of Violence,
Reprisals Need Justice’, 28 November 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/28/
uganda-investigate-killings-rwenzori-region.
220 Decision on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/1006(XXX) (n 8),
para 8.
221 ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda Concerning the Situation in the Republic of the Philippines, 13 October 2016,
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161013-otp-stat-php; K Forster, Philip
pines May Withdraw from the International Criminal Court, says President Rodrigo’
Independent, 17November 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/philippines-
president-rodrigo-duterte-says-they-may-withdraw-from-the-international-criminal-
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Withdrawal is also likely to be an option following a state party’s
failure to cooperate with the Court in the execution of arrest war-
rants. For instance following Uganda’s non-compliance with the re-
quest for arrest and surrender of Al-Bashir to the ICC while he was
present on Uganda’s territory,222 President Museveni publicly re-
ferred to the ICC as a bunch of useless people’223 and a very useless’
institution.224 This has been followed by an open consideration of the
possibility of withdrawing from the Rome Statute.225 However, this
rhetoric is limited to the ICC’s investigations and prosecutions of
serving African leaders. It does not extend to investigating and
prosecuting non-state actors. It is in this context that there is
apparent good cooperation provided by Uganda in the ongoing ICC
trial in the Ongwen case.226
Footnote 221 continued
court-a7422076.html; NJ Morales and S van den Berg Philippines’ Duterte says may
follow Russia’s withdrawal from ’useless’ ICC’ Reuters, 17 November 2016, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-icc-idUSKBN13C0GS.
222 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the non-com-
pliance by the Republic of Uganda with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-
Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council
and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09 (11 July
2016).
223 See ICC a Bunch of Useless People – Museveni’ New Vision, 12 May 2016,
http://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1424384/icc-bunch-useless-people-mu
seveni.
224 See Museveni Praises South Africa’s Decision to Leave ICC as he Arrives in
Zambia for Uhuru Celebrations’, Lusaka Times, 23 October 2016, https://www.lusa
katimes.com/2016/10/23/museveni-praises-south-africas-decision-leave-icc-arrives-zam
bia-uhuru-celebrations/; E Buchanan, Ugandan President Museveni praises African
nations for withdrawing from ’useless’ ICC’ International Business Times, 26 October
2016, http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/ugandan-president-museveni-praises-african-nations-
withdrawing-useless-icc-1588328.
225 See Agencies, Uganda’s Withdrawal from ICC will Depend on AU Decision’,
Daily Monitor, 17 November 2016, http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/
Uganda-ICC-will-depend-AU-decision/688334-3455476-3cofhaz/index.html.
226 See The Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15; ICC, ICC President
meets with President of Uganda’, ICC-CPI-20170302-PR1279 (2 March 2017),
https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1279.
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A few other African ICC state parties in particular Namibia227
and Kenya228 have considered the option to withdraw from the Rome
Statute due to the ICC’s alleged bias against African leaders.229
President Uhuru Kenyatta has observed that the ICC has become a
tool of global power politics and not the justice it was built to dis-
pense.’230 Although there is no evidence to support this view, Russia
has supported African states withdrawal notifications by noting that
the Court [ICC] failed to meet the expectations to become a truly
independent, authoritative international tribunal’.231 However, as
noted in Section 2.2, the ICC remains an independent judicial insti-
tution though its credibility is undermined by the practice of the
Security Council. While it is difficult to claim that there is a single
case at the ICC that should not have been investigated by the
Prosecutor, there are many situations that should have been referred
to the ICC but they have not been referred.
In addition, South Africa’s withdrawal notification led to devel-
opments in diplomatic mechanisms. The first step was taken at the
meeting of the ICC Assembly of States Parties (ASP) in 2016. At
South Africa’s request, the ASP Bureau established an open-ended
working group to develop consultation mechanisms on the imple-
mentation of Article 97 of the Rome Statute.232 These are intended to
be used when a Member State is subject to an ICC obligation to
arrest and surrender to the ICC a serving State official who the State
227 S Immanuel, Cabinet affirms ICC withdrawal’ 24 November 2015, The
Namibian, http://www.namibian.com.na/index.php?page=archive-read&id=144660;
C Milhench, Namibia Will Stay in ICC – if United States Joins, Says President’
Reuters, 1 December 2016 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-namibia-economy-pre
sident-idUSKBN13Q5L0.
228 See Kenya Votes to Leave the ICC Days before Deputy President’s Hague
Trial’ The Guardian (5 September 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
sep/05/kenya-icc-international-criminal-court.
229 See Kenyatta Considers Kenya’s ICC Withdrawal, Warns against Foreign
Interference’ Africa Times, 12 December 2016, http://africatimes.com/2016/12/12/
kenyatta-considers-kenyas-icc-withdrawal-warns-against-foreign-interference/.
230 Ibid.
231 See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Statement by
the Russian Foreign Ministry’, 16 November 2016, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_
policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2523566.
232 Report of the Chair of the working group of the Bureau on the implementation
of article 97 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/15/
35, 24 November 2016.
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considers to be protected by immunities under international law.233 If
effectively developed, such mechanisms could be used to clarify the
procedure to be followed by the Chamber pursuant to Article 98(1) or
(2) as to whether a conflict of obligation indeed exists and whether the
Court should indeed not proceed with its request. This has the
potential to prevent future perceived or real conflict of obligations
like those advanced by South Africa following Al Bashir’s visit to
South Africa.
Furthermore, following South Africa’s withdrawal notification,
without prior parliamentary approval, the High Court of South Africa
declared the notification unconstitutional and invalid’ and ordered
the responsible government officials234 to revoke the notice of with-
drawal’.235 To comply with the above judgment, the Government of
South Africa revoked with immediate effect its notification of with-
drawal on 7 March 2017, signalling possibly that South Africa does
not intend at present to proceed with its withdrawal.236 As such, a new
notification is required, after obtaining prior parliamentary approval,
to restart the 12-month withdrawal period provided for under Article
127(1) of the Rome Statute. In the absence of a new notification of
withdrawal by the Government of South Africa, the High Court
judgment will, at the very least, delay the timeline for withdrawal. This
provides an opportunity to renew South Africa’s commitment to the
principles and values upheld by the Rome Statute.
Importantly, the non-cooperation proceedings against South
Africa at the ICC afford an opening for judicial clarification of the
immunity provisions of the Rome Statute, Articles 27 and 98.237
These Articles have thus far been interpreted in an unsatisfactory and
233 See Section 2.4 above.
234 The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, the Minister of
Justice and Correctional Services and the President of the Republic of South Africa.
235 Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and
Others, Case No 83145/2016 (High Court of South Africa, 22 February 2017).
236 United Nations, South Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal,
C.N.121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10, 7 March 2017.
237 Al Bashir case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II Schedules a Hearing on South
Africa’s Cooperation on 7 April 2017, ICC-CPI-20161208-PR1264, 8 December
2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1264. These proceedings
will consider whether South Africa failed to comply with its obligations under the
[Rome] Statute by not arresting and surrendering Omar Al Bashir to the Court while
he was on its territory’.
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inconsistent manner.238 If the ICC can more convincingly address the
issue of immunities through consistent and satisfactory judicial
means, taking into account the concerns of South Africa and other
member States, this could address concerns raised by South Africa
and render withdrawal unnecessary or unjustifiable. This would
prevent other states with similar concerns raised by South Africa
from considering future withdrawals and instead focus on coopera-
tion and meaningful engagement with the ICC.
Finally, withdrawals are likely to be followed by the repeal of
domestic legislation (e.g. the South African Implementation of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2002), which gives
domestic effect to the Rome Statute.239 The repeal of ICC domestic
implementing legislation constitutes a form of parliamentary ap-
proval for withdrawal from the Rome Statute. This is because after
withdrawing from the Rome Statute, concerned states will no longer
be under a legal obligation to give effect to the domestication of the
provisions of the Rome Statute into national law to ensure that such
law became compatible with the Statute. Should this take place,
without adopting new legislation for domestic investigation and
prosecution of international crimes, an important legal basis for the
domestic prosecution of international crimes would be seriously
weakened. It will be more difficult to get the full cooperation from
withdrawing states in new situations and cases after withdrawals have
taken effect.
IV AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’
RIGHTS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT?
In principle, a case being genuinely investigated or prosecuted by a
lawfully constituted regional, sub-regional or bilateral tribunal or
court may be regarded as being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it’ and thus inadmissible before the
238 C Kreß, The International Criminal Court and Immunities under Interna-
tional Law for States Not Party to the Court’s Statute’ in M Bergsmo and L Yan
(eds), State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law (Torkel Opsahl Academic
EPublisher) 223–265.
239 See Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Act Repeal Bill, B23-2016, http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/b23-2016_im
plementation_of_rome_statute_act_repeal_161103.pdf.
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ICC.240 Although the ICC is complimentary to national criminal
jurisdictions’,241 nothing in the Rome Statute prevent states from
acting collectively at regional, sub-regional or bilateral levels to
establish effective criminal tribunals or courts to genuinely carry out
investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. Following
South Africa’s withdrawal notification from the Rome Statute, a
statement was issued by South African Ministry of Justice and
Correctional services explaining that after withdrawing from the
Rome Statute:
South Africa will work closely with the African Union and with other countries
in Africa to strengthen continental bodies, such as the African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, created to deal with such crimes [crimes against
humanity and other serious crimes] and to prosecute the perpetrators, whilst at
the same time continuing to participate and honour its commitments under
international human rights instruments.242
The above position is misleading since the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights does not have temporal, personal and subject-
matter jurisdiction over international crimes such as genocide, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression. At the time of writ-
ing, there was no operational regional, sub-regional or even bilateral
court in Africa with jurisdiction over international crimes. The juris-
diction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is
explicitly limited by the Court’s founding treaty to determining hu-
man rights cases and disputes submitted to the Court concerning the
interpretation and application of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights,243 the Protocol establishing this Court and any other
relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.244
240 Rome Statute (n 1), Art 17(1)(a); M Jackson, Regional Complementarity: The
Rome Statute and Public International Law (2016) 14(4) Journal of International
Criminal Justice 1061.
241 Rome Statute (n 1), Preamble para 10 and Art 1.
242 See M Masutha, Minister Michael Masutha on the matter of International
Criminal Court and Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir’, 21 October 2016, http://
www.politicsweb.co.za/politics/why-were-withdrawing-from-the-icc–mike-masutha.
243 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 ILM 58 (1982).
244 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 10 June
1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), art 3.
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Thus, given its explicit limited subject-matter jurisdiction, the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights cannot be a regional
alternative to the ICC. Similarly, it cannot be a court that is com-
plementary to the ICC since it cannot conduct criminal investiga-
tions and prosecutions on behalf of any state party to the Rome
Statute. If South Africa meant strengthening the yet-to-be-estab-
lished African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights, this
Court does not justify withdrawing from the Rome Statute. Al-
though the new African Court will have three chambers dealing
respectively with international crimes,245 inter-state disputes and
human rights,246 it will still not be an effective alternative (or even
complementary) to the ICC with respect to serving senior state
officials for three reasons.
First, unlike Article 27 of the Rome Statute (and the practice of
several international criminal tribunals)247 which removes immunities
of heads of states parties to the Rome Statute and other senior state
officials when the ICC investigates, prosecutes or tries an accused, the
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights will not
have jurisdiction over serving heads of state or senior state officials.
Article 46A bis of the African Court of Justice Court Protocol
explicitly protects immunity in the following terms:
No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court against any
serving AU Head of State or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act
245 See Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African
Court of Justice and Human Rights (Malabo Protocol), adopted 27 June 2014,
http://www.au.int/en/treaties/protocol-amendments-protocol-statute-african-court-
justice-and-human-rights, Arts 28A-28M; G Werle & M Vormbaum (eds), The
African Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Malabo Protocol (Asser Press/
Springer, 2017); Amnesty International, Malabo Protocol: Legal And Institutional
Implications of the Merged and Expanded African Court (Amnesty International,
2016); and K Ambos, Expanding the Focus of the ‘‘African Criminal Court’’ in WA
Schabas et al. (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law:
Critical Perspectives (Routledge, 2013) 499–529. The Court is empowered to try
persons’ (individuals and legal persons, with the exception of states) for the fol
lowing crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, unconstitutional
change of government, piracy, terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money launder
ing, trafficking in persons, drugs and hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation of natural
resources and aggression.
246 Malabo Protocol (n 245).
247 Such as Nuremberg Tribunals, Tokyo Tribunals, ICTY, ICTR, Special Court
for Sierra Leone and Lebanon Tribunals.
MANISULI SSENYONJO
in such capacity, or other senior state officials based on their functions, during
their tenure of office.248
The scope of the above provision is unclear. First, what is meant by
anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity’? Is this limited to
the deputy head of state or government or does it extend to all
ministers and all members of parliament? Second, does Article 46A
bis provide both immunity ratione personae (covering all acts, whe-
ther in private or official capacity of heads of state or government and
ministers of foreign affairs) and immunity ratione materiae (covering
state officials acting as such) or only one type of immunity – immu-
nity ratione materiae? Is the phrase based on their functions’ in
Article 46A bis limited to other senior state officials’ or does it also
extend to any serving AU Head of State or Government’, or any-
body acting or entitled to act in such capacity’? Third, are serving AU
state officials who acquire or maintain power through unconstitu-
tional change of government’ entitled to immunity before the African
Court?249 These questions will have to be addressed by the Court.
It is clear nonetheless that the African Court of Justice and Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights, when established, will exercise jurisdiction
primarily over non-state actors. Article 46A bis above clearly indi-
cates that AU heads of state who adopted the above immunity
provision were opposed to criminal justice being applied to them.
This is consistent with the AU’s claim that under customary inter-
national law: Heads of state and other senior state officials are
granted immunities during their tenure of office’.250 According to the
AU these immunities apply to proceedings in both foreign domestic
courts’ as well as to international tribunals’.251 However, this view
goes against the position of the International Court of Justice which
recognised that state officials may be subject to criminal proceedings
before certain international criminal courts’ or tribunals (as opposed
248 For a discussion see M Ssenyonjo and S Nakitto, The African Court of Justice
and Human and Peoples’ Rights International Criminal Law Section’: Promoting
Impunity for African Union Heads of State and Senior State Officials?’ (2016) 16(1)
International Criminal Law Review 71–102. This immunity exception contrasts with
the AU’s proposal for the establishment of an AU-backed hybrid Court for South
Sudan, where no such immunity bar applies and the proposal appears to be modelled
on Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
249 Malabo Protocol (n 245), 28E.
250 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC, Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1
(October 2013) para 9.
251 See AU Press Release 02/2012.
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to prosecution before courts of foreign states) having jurisdiction in
certain instances.252
Article 46A bis is intended to protect serving AU heads of states
and other state officials from being held accountable for potential
individual criminal responsibility for the most serious crimes. It will
thus not enhance the struggle against impunity for ordering,
requesting, encouraging or contributing, in any other manner, to the
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC by serving
senior state officials. Granting immunity to any serving AU Head of
State or Government’, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such
capacity’, and undefined other senior state officials’ while in office
may have the effect of encouraging more AU heads of state to stay
longer in power to avoid criminal accountability. In contrast, Article
27 of the Rome Statute provides that official capacity as a Head of
State or Government… shall in no case exempt a person from
criminal responsibility’ and that immunities shall not bar the Court
from exercising its jurisdiction.253 Due to the granting of immunity,
relevant cases involving AU state officials would remain admissible
before the ICC where it has jurisdiction under Article 17 of the Rome
Statute as a consequence of inaction.254 This is because the effect of
immunity is that no case’ will be investigated or prosecuted by the
African Court (on behalf of any state having jurisdiction) against
senior state officials. As a result, cases involving African state officials
will remain admissible before the ICC since it will not be possible to
argue that the same individual and substantially the same conduct’ as
alleged in the proceedings before the ICC is being investigated or
prosecuted before the African Court.255
Second, the criminal jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice
and Human and Peoples’ Rights will only apply to crimes committed
after the entry into force of the Court’s Protocol and establishment of
the Court. 15 ratifications are required for the Protocol to enter into
force, but by January 2017 none had been secured for more than two
252 See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002 (2002) ICJ Reports 3, paras
58–61.
253 The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, No. ICC-01/09-
01/11, Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excuse from Continuous Presence at
Trial, Trial Chamber V, 18 June 2013, para 67.
254 Katanga et al., ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, 25 September 2009, para 75–78.
255 Muthaura et al., ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, 30 August 2011, para 40.
MANISULI SSENYONJO
years though 9 states had signed the Protocol.256 South Africa,
Burundi and The Gambia had not signed or ratified the Protocol.
This compares very poorly to the Rome Statute which had 60 rati-
fications within 2 years of being open for signature and ratification.
Given the reluctance of African states to accept jurisdiction of a
regional court, it is likely to take several decades for most African
states to ratify the Protocol. For example, almost two decades after
the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
People’s Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human
and People’s Rights,257 with human rights jurisdiction only, it had
been ratified by only 30 Member states258 and only 8 had deposited
the optional declaration under Article 34(6) thereof allowing indi-
viduals and Non-Governmental organisations (NGOs) with observer
status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
direct access to the Court.259
Finally even if the Protocol enters into force, ratified by all
withdrawing states and Article 46A bis is amended to remove
immunity, there are still other legitimate concerns about the likely
effectiveness of the African Court. These include the very wide
jurisdiction of the Court, the poor structure of the Court, human
resource capacity, and the capacity of African states to meet the
financial needs of such a Court.260
V CONCLUSION
While signing and ratifying the Rome Statute is a voluntary and a
sovereign decision of every state, state withdrawals from the Rome
Statute undermine the global movement towards greater account-
ability to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of the most
256 The Protocol had been signed by Benin, Chad, Congo, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, and Sao Tomé & Principe.
257 Adopted 9 June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004, OAU Doc. OAU/
LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III).
258 These were Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo,
Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Gabon, The Gambia; Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda,
Rwanda, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania,
Togo and Tunisia.
259 These were Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Mali and the
United Republic of Tanzania.
260 Ssenyonjo and Nakitto (n 248).
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serious crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and
aggression) and a ruled-based international order. Withdrawals from
the Rome Statute limit the Court’s jurisdictional reach and its ability
to provide justice to the victims of such crimes and contribute to the
prevention of future atrocities. Withdrawing from the Rome Statute
without a credible alternative mechanism (national or regional judicial
systems) in place to investigate and prosecute international crimes
without any distinction based on official capacity shields state officials
who commit crimes from accountability. It also undermines the AU’s
condemnation and rejection of impunity’ in respect of grave crimes, in
particular genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.261 A
number of measures may be taken to prevent further future justifi-
cations of withdrawals by African states from the Rome Statute.
First, the ICC mainly through the Assembly of States Parties must
engage in a meaningful and constructive dialogue with the reasons –
good’ or bad’ – advanced by withdrawing states, such as those ad-
vanced by South Africa, to justify withdrawal. To enhance the
credibility of the ICC and complementarity with the state parties, the
ICC Prosecutor, President of the Court and President of the
Assembly of State Parties should conduct extensive awareness cam-
paigns. While more outreach would require more resources, it is
helpful to counteract media, political and diplomatic (mis)informa-
tion campaigns used by states to undermine the ICC. Such campaigns
should be done in cooperation with state parties, UN bodies, regional
organisations and relevant domestic actors (such as the judiciary,
prosecutors, lawyers, victims, and civil society) on the ICC’s work at
the national, sub-regional, regional and international levels.
Second, the Prosecutor must demonstrate that crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court are investigated objectively wherever such
crimes are committed. In particular, the Prosecutor must ensure that
all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed in appro-
priate non-African situations are pursued beyond preliminary
investigations. These include crimes against humanity and war crimes
committed by parties to the conflict – the Georgian armed forces, the
South Ossetian forces, and the Russian armed forces – in the context
of an international armed conflict in and around South Ossetia,
Georgia between 1 July and 10 October 2008262; war crimes com-
261 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, 4(o) and 4(h).
262 See Pre-Trial Chamber 1, Situation in Georgia: Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Request for Authorization of an Investigation, No. ICC-01/15, 27 January 2016.
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mitted by members of the US armed forces and the US Central
Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan263; and crimes against humanity
of torture, deportation, persecution, and other inhumane acts com-
mitted against asylum seekers including women and children by
Australian government officials and their private contractors.264
Third, it is proposed that instead of withdrawing from the Rome
Statute, concerned African states could invoke Article 98(2) of the
Rome Statute which provides that:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international
agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to
surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
There are different views about the above provision. One view is that
the above article was intended to protect the status of forces agree-
ments in existence prior to signature of the Rome Statute.265 On this
basis it is argued that Article 98(2) only refers to existing agreements’
which means agreements concluded by a State party before the lat-
ter’s signature of the Statute’.266 Accordingly it is argued that a state
intentionally negotiating an Article 98(2) designed to purposefully
avoid its obligations to arrest and surrender a person sought by the
Court would be violating the basic principle not to defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty.267 Another view is that Article 98(2) allows
agreements negotiated and ratified subsequently.268 Under the above
provision, African states can negotiate a multilateral treaty among
themselves to prohibit the arrest and surrender of any national of a
non-party state including head of state or senior state official to the
ICC provided any such individual is indispensable’ to the pursuit of a
263 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016 (n 65), para 211.
264 See The Situation in Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes against
Humanity in the Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (February 2017),
https://www.scribd.com/document/339213633/Communication-made-to-International-
Criminal-Court-requesting-investigation-of-Australia-and-corporate-contractors.
265 See C Kreß and K Prost, Article 98: Cooperation with Respect to Waiver of
Immunity and Consent to Surrender’ in Triffterer and Ambos (n 7), 2117–2146, at
2142–2146.
266 Ibid., at 2146.
267 Ibid.; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (n 189), Art 18.
268 D Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America’s Original Intent’
(2005) 3(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 333, at 336.
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peace settlement for an ongoing conflict in Africa.269 Once such a
treaty enters into force, the Court is obliged to first obtain the consent
of the sending State’ for the surrender of a person wanted by the
ICC.
Fourth, since the ICC is not a substitute for national justice systems
but it is rather complementary’ to them,270 it is imperative that states
develop effective national (or regional) criminal justice systems to
genuinely investigate and prosecute international crimes. African
states that are unable to carry out prompt, impartial, thorough and
transparent investigations and/or prosecutions of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the ICC must enhance their domestic institutional
(investigative and judicial) capacity. This should include seeking
assistance from the ICC Prosecutor’s office, conducting legal reform
by enacting and enforcing ICC national implementing legislation
integrating provisions of the Rome Statute in domestic law including
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction and granting authority to na-
tional prosecuting authority to refer situations to the ICC, coopera-
tion with the Court and enforcement/execution of sentences,
enhancing national capacity-building by training investigators, pros-
ecutors and judges and infrastructure investment in the court system.
Fifth, the Rome Statute does not indicate whether a notification of
withdrawal can itself be withdrawn at any time before the withdrawal
becomes effective. In principle, it will be in the interest of victims of
international crimes for Burundi to follow the example of The
Gambia and South Africa to withdraw their withdrawal notifications
and for other ICC state parties to refrain from withdrawing from the
Rome Statute in the future. As noted above, the expanded jurisdic-
tion of the African Court does not affect the jurisdiction of the ICC
particularly over serving state officials who may enjoy immunity
under Article 46 bis.
Finally, notifications of withdrawal from treaties must be consis-
tent with relevant domestic law.271 As confirmed by the South Afri-
can High Court, South Africa’s notification of withdrawal, without
prior parliamentary approval, was unconstitutional, invalid and must
269 D Scheffer, More Options for Africa under the Rome Statute’ Just Security, 19
November 2016, https://www.justsecurity.org/34669/options-africa-rome-statute-in
ternational-criminal-court-scheffer/#more-34669.
270 Rome Statute (n 1), Preamble para 10, Arts 1 and 17.
271 See R (Miller) v The Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016]
EWHC 2768 (Admin); R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of
State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5.
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be revoked.272 Therefore, the executive must wait for parliament to
successfully repeal the ICC domestic implementing legislation before
submitting a valid notification of withdrawal to restart the 12-month
withdrawal period under Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute. This
period could be used by South Africa to reconsider the wisdom or
desirability of withdrawing from the Rome Statute and to engage in
constructive diplomatic dialogue and judicial mechanisms to address
issues raised in Section II above.
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